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FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO BLACKMAIL: HOW THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1988) HAS PERVERTED ONE OF AMERICA’S MOST
HISTORIC CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
Steven W. Fitschen*
INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO HIGH-WATER MARKS
For fourteen years, members of Congress repeatedly introduced legislation
directed at a single subject. A key underpinning for the necessity of the legislation was
provided by the opinions of two Supreme Court justices. Yet, for the past nine years,
Congress has gone silent on the same topic. This Article argues that it is past time for
Congress to reconsider this topic, and that if it will not do so, the Supreme Court can
rectify the situation without engaging in judicial legislation.
Perhaps the best view of Congress’s efforts can be seen by examining the high-
water mark of those efforts, which occurred in 2006. In that year, it was the belief of
247 United States representatives that “the Establishment Clause [of the United States
Constitution] does not secure an individual right.”1 Therefore, they believed attor-
ney’s fees should not be available in Establishment Clause cases under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1988, the federal civil rights and fee shifting statutes that make such
awards possible.2
Similarly, by 2006, two Supreme Court Justices had indicated that the Establish-
ment Clause did not protect individual rights.3 Indeed, the 247 Congressmen explicitly
* Steven W. Fitschen is President of the National Legal Foundation and Senior Legal
Advisor to the Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation. He formerly served as Research
Professor of Law at the Regent University School of Law.
1 H.R.REP.NO.109-657,at 11 (2006). The number 247 should perhaps be qualified with
the phrase “at least arguably.” The quoted language comes from the Report issued by the
House Judiciary Committee in support of the passage of H.R. 2679, Veterans’ Memorials, Boy
Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of Religion Act of 2006. Id. It is possible,
of course, that some representatives voted for H.R. 2679, which would have stripped attorney’s
fees in Establishment Clause cases, without endorsing the particular view quoted from the
Report, but no other rationale was ever expressed in the Report or the debate. The recorded vote
was 244–173. 152 CONG. REC. H7422-23 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 2006) (Representative Mollohan
(D-WV)’s vote change from “yea” to “nay” is already reflected in the vote count). However,
three additional representatives stated in the Congressional Record that had they been present,
they would have voted in favor of the bill or its underlying rule. Id. (statement of Rep. Green);
152 CONG. REC. E1856 (Extensions of Remarks, Sept. 28, 2006) (Personal Explanation of
Rep. Castle); 152 CONG. REC. E1920 (Extensions of Remarks, Sept. 29, 2006) (Personal
Explanation of Rep. Pombo).
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-657, at 11.
3 See infra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
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relied on the words of one of those justices, Anthony Kennedy, for this proposition;4
and Justice Thomas had by then made the even more emphatic, unequivocal state-
ment that “[t]he Establishment Clause does not purport to protect individual rights.”5
And yet, here we are, fourteen years later, and attorney’s fees are still being
awarded in Establishment Clause cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.6 This Article will
argue that this practice should stop, either by amendment of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988 or through a pronouncement by the Supreme Court that Establishment Clause
claims can no longer be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By way of introduction, we
can examine the backstory to how 247 representatives came to assert that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not secure any individual rights.
In 2000, an attorney for the Indiana Civil Liberties Union7 asserted that in
Establishment Clause cases, “[i]f we prevail, we get fees, and they’re going to pay the
[Indiana Civil Liberties Union] an enormous amount of money.”8 This and other state-
ments and activities by the ICLU did not escape the attention of another Indianan who,
in 1994, had been elected to Congress. By 1998—even before the ICLU so boldly
threw down the gauntlet of attorney’s fees blackmail9—John Hostettler (IN-08) had had
4 H.R.REP.NO. 109-657, at 11 & n.43 (quoting Lee v. Weissman, 505 U.S. 577, 591–92
(1992)). This is a fair reading of Justice Kennedy’s words, despite his never having—by
2006 or since—joined any of Justice Thomas’s opinions addressed in the following footnote
and accompanying text.
5 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., con-
curring), abrogated on another point by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 606 (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n
v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994, 1007 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 741, 851 n.20 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (reaffirming his view that the Establishment Clause is federal-
ist and thus not capable of incorporation as a right); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
726–29 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678–80
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
6 See, e.g., Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 328 F. Supp. 3d 1203,
1214–15 (D. Colo. 2018).
7 On January 1, 2006, the Indiana Civil Liberties Union changed its name to the “ACLU
of Indiana.” ICLU to Become ACLU of Indiana, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 22, 2005),
https://www.aclu.org/news/iclu-become-aclu-indiana?tab=case&redirect=organization-news
-and-highlights/iclu-become-aclu-indiana [https://perma.cc/QV9F-CYGZ].
8 Rick Thackeray, All Eyes Poised on the 7th Circuit Outcome; ‘Commandments’
Decision Seen as Key to Glut of Cases, THE IND. LAWYER, Nov. 22, 2000, at 1.
9 For the use of the term “blackmail,” see infra text accompanying note 181. The legis-
lation introduced multiple times in the House, see supra notes 1–4; infra notes 10–30, and
twice in the Senate used the word “extort.” Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals,
and Other Public Expressions of Religion Protection Act of 2006, S. 3696, 109th Cong.
(2006); Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of Reli-
gion Protection Act of 2007, S. 415, 110th Cong. (2007). In fact, after passage in the House,
the title of the Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions
of Religion Protection Act of 2006, was amended to A Bill to Amend the Revised Statutes
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enough. That year, during the 105th Congress, he introduced the Public Expression
of Religion Act of 1998.10 Hostettler introduced similar legislation during the 106th,
107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses.11 Until the 109th Congress, each resolution was
referred to the House Judiciary Committee, and in turn, was referred to one of several
subcommittees but advanced no further.12
But in the 109th Congress, Hostettler’s bill, first entitled Public Expression of
Religion Act of 2005, and later entitled Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals,
and Other Public Expressions of Religion Protection Act of 2006, made it out of the
Constitution subcommittee and the Judiciary Committee with a published hearing13
and a report.14 As noted above, the House passed the Bill, and its counterpart was
introduced in the Senate.15 There, hearings were held and, together with submitted state-
ments, were published as Paying Your Own Way: Creating a Fair Standard for Attor-
ney’s Fee Awards in Establishment Clause Cases: Hearings Before the Senate Sub-
committee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the Committee on
the Judiciary.16 Together, the House hearing and report, the Senate hearings, and the
House debate demonstrate both what motivated the concern of Representative
Hostettler (R-IN) and other representatives and senators, and why it is legitimate to be-
lieve that Establishment Clause cases ought not be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17
of the United States to Prevent the Use of the Legal System in a Manner that Extorts Money from
State and Local Governments, and the Federal Government, and Inhibits Such Governments’
Constitutional Actions Under the First, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 152 CONG.REC.
19838 (2006), to comport with the Bill’s long title. See H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. (2006).
In addition to the information provided here, and in the text accompanying the notes cited
here, occasions of the use of the word “extort” can be found by going to the https://www.con
gress.gov website, select the “All Legislation” drop down from the menu at the upper left.
Enter “Public Expression of Religion” in the search box and hit enter. Choose each bill in
turn. For each bill, choose both the “Text” tab and the “Titles” tab to see whether some form
of the word “extort” was used. Note also the use of “chilling.” [https://perma.cc/SF8T-9582].
10 H.R. 3288, 105th Cong. (1998).
11 See infra note 12 (following all steps except the last).
12 Search Results, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov (select the “All Legislation”
drop down from the menu at the upper left; enter “Public Expression of Religion” into the
search box and hit enter; choose each bill in turn; once a bill is chosen, click on “Actions”
to find each bill’s fate) [https://perma.cc/SF8T-9582].
13 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-657, at 14 (2006).
14 Id.
15 S. 3696, 109th Cong. (2006).
16 Paying Your Own Way: Creating a Fair Standard for Attorney’s Fee Awards in Estab-
lishment Clause Cases: Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil
Rights and Property Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter
Paying Your Own Way].
17 The above represents the high-water mark for the Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts,
Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of Religion Protection Act, although another
Indianan, Dan Burton (R-IN), continued to introduce it in the 110th through 112th Congresses,
and Senator Brownback (R-KS) introduced the bill in the Senate again in the 110th Congress,
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As for the legitimacy of eliminating fees for Establishment Clause cases, both
the House and Senate Reports endorsed the views of witnesses and of those who sub-
mitted written statements, including the present author, that emphasized that § 1983
was enacted to protect the historic civil rights of individuals and that the Establishment
Clause was instead a structural provision aimed at prohibiting the establishment of
a national religion.18 That this is so and that § 1988 was also never intended to apply
to Establishment Clause cases is the major thesis of this Article.
However, it is worth emphasizing just how alert Congress had become to the black-
mail issue.19 As noted, the ICLU had bragged in 2000 that it would earn “enormous”
fees whenever it prevailed in an Establishment Clause case.20 However, Rep.
Hostettler was, in part, motivated by similar earlier threats from the ICLU, which
perhaps had been more restrained in how it characterized the fees it routinely seeks:
I first introduced the Public Expression of Religion Act in
the 105th Congress after I realized that the mention of attorneys
fees in these kinds of cases were jeopardizing our constituents’
constitutional rights. An example of this was in 1993. [sic] when
the Indiana Civil Liberties Union, which is affiliated with the
American Civil Liberties Union, mailed a letter to all the public
educators in the State of Indiana. In this letter, the ICLU informs
the educators that should they support a prayer at graduation, the
ICLU will sue both the school and any individuals who approve
the graduation prayer. The letter plainly states the ICLU will win
and that whoever is sued will have to pay not only their attor-
neys fees but the ICLU fees as well.
These threats to teachers, who are highly unlikely to be able
to pay their own attorneys fees let alone the exorbitant attorneys
fees of the ICLU. [sic] make it very likely educators would capitu-
late to the ICLU before even checking to make sure the ICLU
has their facts right.21
as he had in the 109th. See supra note 12 (follow the steps in the note for pertinent informa-
tion on these bills).
Similarly, bills were introduced both before and after the high-water mark that would
have allowed schools to use federal funds to defend schools that were sued for putative
Establishment Clause violations and that would have disallowed fees in such cases, but these
bills either never passed, or the fee provisions were removed prior to passage. See supra note
12 (follow the steps in the note using the following search terms: “Establishment Clause”
AND “attorney’s fee” AND school; a few false hits will be produced, but the reader will be
able to dig deeper into the specifics noted in the text accompanying this note).
18 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-657, at 11 n.42 (2006).
19 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20 See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 7.
21 152 CONG. REC. 19804 (2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
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But the ICLU was not the only strict separationist organization on Congress’s
radar screen. The House Report refers to “the ACLU or similar organizations”22 and
“the ACLU and its affiliates.”23 And one Senate witness years earlier in the hearings
for the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 had referred to “the ‘separa-
tionist’ groups which bring the majority of these cases (the ACLU, AJCongress,
Americans United, Freedom From Religion Foundation).”24 However, most of the
ire was directed towards the ACLU generically.25 Deriving its information from
witnesses, submitted statements, and members’ own knowledge, the House Report
illustrated its view that the elimination of fees in Establishment Clause cases was
necessary with a bulleted list of then-recent fee awards and settlements in cases
brought by the ACLU:
• The ACLU received $950,000 in a settlement with the City of San
Diego in a case involving the San Diego Boy Scouts.
• The ACLU received $150,000 from Barrow County, Georgia, after a
Federal judge ordered the county to remove a framed copy of the Ten
Commandments from a hallway in the County Courthouse.
• The ACLU received $121,500 from Kentucky in a case to remove a
Ten Commandments monument outside the Capitol.
• The ACLU received $38,000 in legal fees in a case against Hamilton
County, Tennessee, to remove the Ten Commandments from a court
building.
• The ACLU and two other groups received nearly $550,000 in an Ala-
bama case to remove the Ten Commandments from a courthouse.
• The ACLU received nearly $75,000 from Habersham County, Georgia,
in a case involving two Ten Commandments displays, one at the county
courthouse and one in the county swimming pool building.26
The Report also pulled no punches in documenting the blackmailing tactic of
the ACLU:
A huge number of these legal “victories” have been trum-
peted in ACLU press releases, in which the ACLU often openly
acknowledges it was the threat of lawsuits against localities that
could least afford them that resulted in the ACLU’s getting its
way. The following are examples of ACLU press releases:
22 H.R. REP. NO. 109-657, at 4 (2006).
23 Id. at 27.
24 Paying Your Own Way, supra note 16, at 185 (prepared statement of Marc Stern,
General Counsel, American Jewish Congress).
25 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-657, at 6 n.13.
26 Id. (citations omitted).
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• “County Officials in Iowa Agree to Remove Ten Command-
ments from Courthouse Grounds” (March 15, 2001) (“Ben
Stone, Executive Director of the Iowa Civil Liberties Union
[said] ‘[w]e . . . wanted to spare the community a divisive
and costly lawsuit.’”) (emphasis added);
• “ACLU of Montana Settles Lawsuit Over Ten Command-
ments, Nativity Scene Placed on County Property” (October
12, 2000) (“The ACLU said the lawsuit was a ’last attempt’
to nudge Custer County into addressing the possible uncon-
stitutionality of the displays.”) (emphasis added);
• “ACLU Action Prompts [Val Verde, California] School
Board to Abandon Posting of Ten Commandments” (No-
vember 24, 1999) (“The school board’s decision came in the
wake of the filing of a lawsuit last week by the ACLU . . .”)
(emphasis added);
• “ACLU of Illinois Lauds Officials’ Decision to Remove
Religious Postings in Harrisburg Schools” (December 7,
1999) (The “Director of Communications for the ACLU
[said] ‘This action means the people of Harrisburg can focus
all their energies, resources, and attention on the needs of
their students, rather than worrying about a lengthy, expen-
sive and disruptive court battle.’”) (emphasis added);
• “Commandments Come Down in West Virginia School”
(August 27, 1999) (“School board attorney Brian Abraham
recommended at a Thursday night meeting that the signs be
taken down to avoid possible lawsuits.”) (emphasis added).
The County of Los Angeles was recently extorted into re-
moving a tiny cross from its official county seal (symbolizing the
founding of the city by missionaries), which is costing the county
around $1 million as it would entail changing the seal on some
90,000 uniforms, 6,000 buildings, and 12,000 county vehicles.27
And it was clear that all restraint was gone: as quoted in Senate testimony, one
ACLU official, after the ACLU and Americans United for Separation of Church and
State attorneys were awarded $2 million in a lawsuit against the Dover Area School
District involving the teaching of intelligent design, stated, “[t]he $2 million was a
very conservative number, so they got a terrific deal. The next school district isn’t
going to get the same break that Dover did.”28
In the intervening fourteen years, nothing has changed. To take an example other
than the ACLU, the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) has also gotten
27 Id. at 7 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
28 Paying Your Own Way, supra note 16, at 16.
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very aggressive in publicizing its use of threats via its website.29 And until Congress
or the Supreme Court eliminates the award of attorney’s fees nothing will change.
As every witness matter-of-factly admitted in their Senate testimony, § 1988 is a
“club” to be used against governments.30
Whether Congress will ever surpass its previous high-water mark and get a bill
through both houses and whether there would follow a veto fight are unknowns. But
Congress is not the only institution that can remove the club, the blackmail, the
extortion. Courts could accomplish the same thing if they would decline to permit
fees to be awarded in Establishment Clause claims. Indeed, either Congress or the
courts could go further than Congress’s previous attempt. They could declare that
Establishment Clause cases are not validly brought under § 1983.31 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court of the United States would need to weigh in.
In fact, two courts of appeals have already weighed in, and thus there is a judicial
high-water mark to accompany the legislative high-water mark, albeit an older and
less significant one.32 In Cammack v. Waihee,33 resident taxpayers of Hawaii chal-
lenged the Hawaii law that made Good Friday a state holiday, alleging that it violated
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution and the co-extensive
Establishment Clause of the Hawaii Constitution.34 The Ninth Circuit, perhaps anti-
cipating the points raised by this Article (without making those points), upheld the
district court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the government defen-
dants.35 However, along the way, the Ninth Circuit questioned, without further
addressing, the “efficacy” of bringing the Establishment Clause claim under § 1983:
29 See, e.g., FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, https://ffrf.org (last visited Oct. 22,
2020) (enter “demand letter” in the search box; within many letters returned by the search,
FFRF discusses the fee awards won in similar cases; other discussions of fee awards are
prevalent on FFRF’s website) [https://perma.cc/SET4-FF72].
30 Obviously, such comments came from witnesses both opposing and supporting the bill,
since every witness agreed to the point. See, e.g., Paying Your Own Way, supra note 16, at
23–27 (answers and comments of witnesses Stern, Woodruff, Rogers, Staver, and Lloyd).
31 § 1983 has a jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (2006). The Supreme
Court of the United States has explained the relationship between § 1983 and § 1343(3). See,
e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543–44 n.7 (1972). However, because
many courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, speak of jurisdiction under
§ 1983, this Article will follow suit and use this shorthand, except when the distinction is
required, as it will be in the discussion of Maine v. Thiboutot and Chapman v. Houston ETC.
and related cases. See infra Part II. For example, the following Westlaw search returns 823
court opinions as of this writing: adv: “jurisdiction #under s 1983” OR “jurisdiction #under
42 u.s.c. s 1983.”
This inconsistency of courts, including the Supreme Court, is unfortunate. It must be
taken into account by those researching the issues covered by this Article.
32 See, e.g., Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
33 Id.
34 Also challenged were state and city collective bargaining agreements regarding paid
leave on Good Friday. Id. at 767–68.
35 Id. at 768, 782.
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Because the parties have not briefed the point, we express no
opinion on the efficacy of bringing an establishment clause chal-
lenge under section 1983. We note that this route has been traveled
before without exciting controversy (or even comment). See,
e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 785, 103 S. Ct. 3330,
3332–33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) (simply noting that establish-
ment clause challenge was brought under section 1983); ACLU
v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655, 656–57 (3d Cir. 1988)
(same), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S. Ct.
3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989).36
Since Cammack, additional cases, such as Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe,37 have reached the Supreme Court in a similar posture to Allegheny,38 that
is, the Establishment Clause claim had been brought under § 1983 without the Court
acknowledging that fact. However, to date, in addition to Marsh v. Chambers,39 only
two Establishment Clause cases, Van Orden v. Perry,40 and McCreary County v.
American Civil Liberties Union,41 exist that have been brought under § 1983 and in
which the Court has both acknowledged that fact and decided the Establishment
Clause claim.42 Thus, no great body of Supreme Court case law stands for the
proposition that Establishment Clause cases should or can be brought under § 1983.
36 Id. at 767 n.3.
37 Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 530 U.S. 290
(2000).
38 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
39 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
40 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
41 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
42 In only three other cases to date has the Court even acknowledged an Establishment
Clause claim being brought under § 1983. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., the Court acknowledged that all the claims, including the Establishment Clause
claim, had been brought under § 1983. 508 U.S. 384, 389 (1993). However, the Court decided
the case on the Free Speech claim and did not reach the Establishment Clause claim. Id. at 390.
In Karcher v. May, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that a New Jersey
statute violated the Establishment Clause “for lack of a valid secular purpose.” 484 U.S. 72,
76 (1987). The Supreme Court once again did not reach the Establishment Clause issue but
instead dismissed the appeal, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), for lack of jurisdiction
because the two defendants that represented the legislature’s position in the matter were no
longer legislative officers, and the new representatives of the legislature did not wish to
appeal. Id. at 81, 83. Finally, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc., a Christian school sought an injunction to prevent the Civil Rights Commission from
investigating an employment discrimination complaint, claiming it would violate the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 477 U.S. 619, 621 (1986). The merits of neither First
Amendment claim were reached when the Court held that the district court, under Younger
v. Harris, should have abstained from deciding the case, adding that the constitutional issues
could be addressed in the state proceedings. Id. at 625, 628.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has often allowed certain types of claims to come
before it on multiple occasions without comment and then, when a party squarely
raised the jurisdictional issue, decided that such claims were not properly brought.43
In fact, the Court has done this on several occasions in the § 1983 context.44 For
example, the Court had often accepted cases in which a state had been sued under
§ 198345 before deciding in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police that a state
is not a person for purposes of § 1983.46 Significantly, the Will Court specifically
noted that the “Court has never considered itself bound [by prior sub silentio holdings]
when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.”47
Until 2009, neither the Ninth Circuit nor any other court had ever revisited the
possibility mentioned by the Cammack court that Establishment Clause cases ought
not be brought under § 1983.48 Although the author has made a shortened version
of some of the arguments contained in this Article in amicus briefs filed with various
courts, no court ever interacted with the argument until the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit did so in its opinion in Green v. Haskell County,49 a case in which the
ACLU and its Oklahoma affiliate sued the county over its Ten Commandments
display. That court rejected the argument for reasons with which this Article obvi-
ously disagrees.50 Subsequently, the issue was raised in another Tenth Circuit case,
American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan,51 a case in which American Atheists and the Utah
Civil Rights and Liberties Foundation challenged roadside crosses memorializing
slain state troopers, in which the author and the National Legal Foundation were
involved.52 There, the argument was made on behalf of the Utah Highway Patrol
43 See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
44 See id.
45 See id. at 63 n.4 (collecting cases).
46 Id. at 71.
47 Id. at 63 n.4 (alteration in original) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5
(1974)).
48 See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 767 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991).
49 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009).
50 Id. at 788 n.1. The Tenth Circuit rejected the brief and this Article’s assertion that the
Establishment Clause does not protect individual rights. Id.; cf. infra Parts II and III. The basis
for the court’s rejection was its statement that “[t]he Establishment Clause protects religious
liberty no less than the Free Exercise Clause does.” Green, 568 F.3d at 788 n.1 (citing multiple
cases and a law review article in support of this proposition). True, but irrelevant. To say that
the Establishment Clause protects religious liberty is not equivalent, or even tantamount, to
saying that it protects an individual right. The Tenth Circuit also thought the brief and this
Article’s thesis were foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1 (1980). Id.; cf. infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text and Section I.C. The amicus
brief took on both of those arguments directly, as does this Article, and the Tenth Circuit’s
rejection of the arguments seems to be based on missing the point of the historical legitimacy
of both arguments. See Green, 568 F.3d at 788 n.1.
51 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir.), amended and superseded on reh’g sub nom. Am. Atheists,
Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010).
52 Id. at 1150–51.
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Association, the defendant-intervenor-appellee.53 However, in Duncan, the court merely
dropped a footnote stating that the Green court had already rejected the argument.54
No court has since entertained, accepted, or rejected the argument.
Furthermore—and this argument was not made to the Tenth Circuit in either
Green or Duncan—the problem with challenging putative or real Establishment
Clause violations under § 1983 alone is highlighted by both the majority and con-
curring opinions in Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone.55 In Inyo County, the Paiute-
Shoshone tribe sued in federal court under both § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (commerce jurisdiction), and the “federal
common law of Indian affairs.”56 Justice Ginsburg, writing for an eight-member
majority, wrote that the tribe was not a “person” who could sue under § 1983.57
However, because the tribe had invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts via
other means, the Court remanded the case for consideration of jurisdiction vel non
on those bases.58 However, the relevant point here is that when plaintiffs invoke
jurisdiction only under § 1983 in Establishment Clause cases—and assuming the
court agrees that § 1983 does not provide such jurisdiction—the court would be re-
quired to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.59
Furthermore, Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Inyo County is also problem-
atic for Establishment Clause plaintiffs filing suit only under § 1983.60 Justice Stevens
believed that the tribe was a “person” under § 1983.61 However, he opined that the
tribe had alleged only a putative deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity that was,
in fact, no such thing.62 While his reason for this belief will not be relevant in Establish-
ment Clause cases (he believed that the tribe’s claim was instead based on a “judge-
made doctrine”),63 nevertheless, should a court agree that the Establishment Clause
protects no rights, privileges, or immunities, it logically follows that claims brought
only under § 1983 should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.64
With these high-water marks—the Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals,
and Other Public Expressions of Religion Protection Act of 2006 and Cammack v.
Waihee—as background and with the author’s belief that Establishment Clause cases
should indeed not be eligible to be brought under § 1983 and therefore ought not be
eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988, certain obvious threshold
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1151–52 n.4.
55 538 U.S. 701, 702 (2003).
56 Id. at 706.
57 Id. at 712.
58 Id.
59 See id.
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questions must be asked. While these questions could be phrased in various ways,
two rather basic phrasings serve as an adequate springboard for what follows: What
is wrong with bringing Establishment Clause cases under § 1983? Isn’t it done all the
time? The answer to the second question is “yes,” it is done all the time nowadays.65
The answer to the first question is what this Article is all about. Along the way, the
Article will also return to the first question and demonstrate that Establishment
Clause claims historically were not brought under § 1983.66 That prior practice
should be reinstated—whether through legislation or through Supreme Court
pronouncement—to remove the blackmail potential of § 1983.67
Part I of this Article will first show that the purpose of § 1988 is to allow attorney’s
fees in civil rights cases, including those brought under § 1983.68 However, the Article
will show in Part II, by examining the enactment of § 1983 as part of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, that Establishment Clause cases should not be included within the
“civil rights” rubric under either § 1988 or § 1983.69 This thesis will be reinforced by
examining, in Part III, portions of the congressional debate over the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment, since the Ku Klux Klan Act was referred to as “[a]n Act to
enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”70 The Article will examine
one counterargument based on the Supreme Court’s current incorporation doctrine
in Part IV.71 The Article will end with some concluding remarks.72 In sum, the Article
will show that rather than fulfilling its original purpose of protecting racial minori-
ties73 § 1983—in combination with § 1988—is now being used by strict separationists
65 See infra Conclusion.
66 See infra notes 326–28 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 329–31 and accompanying text.
68 See infra Sections I.A–B.
69 See infra Part II.
70 Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
71 See infra Part IV.
72 See infra Conclusion.
73 Representative James Beck (D-KY) described the purpose of the statute as such: “Under
it negroes, as well as Indians, Gipsies [sic], Chinese, and all the Mongolian races born in the
United States, men and women, young and old, can now sue and be sued in the courts of the
United States.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess.691(1869). Similar sentiments are scat-
tered through the debates over the three Civil War Amendments, the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, and the other enforcement and civil rights acts preceding and following the Act. These
sentiments often require significant context-setting, represent only one side of a debate, or
both. Thus, I will limit myself to the above example from Representative Beck. However,
one such act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, plainly states that it applies to “citizens, of every
race and color.” Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The significance of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 will be explored infra notes 275–78 and accompanying text.
A similar view (with regard to the three Civil War Amendments) is found in Justice
Miller’s opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this pro-
tection. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their
118 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:107
to “blackmail” state and local governments all across the country.74 A statute, the very
purpose of which is to ensure the enforcement of one of our nation’s most historic
civil rights laws, should not be perverted in this manner.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988)
WAS DESIGNED TO AID CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGANTS ONLY
As has been stated elsewhere, “[t]he purposes for which § 1988 was enacted are
not hard to discover.”75 The legislative history of the Act is unambiguous. However,
as will be discussed in Part II, the majority and minority opinions of the Supreme
fair and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubtedly while
negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed
the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or
hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall
develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory,
this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other
rights are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall
within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply, though
the party interested may not be of African descent.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873).
Furthermore, the debates over the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act dealt exten-
sively with discrimination against women. See, e.g., 122 CONG.REC. 31,472, 31,851 (1976),
reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
UNITED STATES SENATE,CIVILRIGHTS ATTORNEY’SFEES AWARDSACT OF 1976 (PUBLICLAW
94-559, S. 2278) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
at 22, 92 (1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK] (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 122 CONG. REC.
31,488, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK at 56–58 (statement of Sen. Allen); 122 CONG. REC.
35,122, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK at 254 (statement of Rep. Drinan); 122 CONG.REC. 35,127,
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK at 267 (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
74 See infra Conclusion.
75 The author made this statement in written testimony to both the United States House
of Representatives and the United States Senate. The author made this statement with regard
to the Veterans’ Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of
Religion Protection Act of 2006. Paying Your Own Way, supra note 16, at 71. The author
also made the statement with regard to Public Expressions of Religion Act of 2005, Hearing on
H.R. Res. 2679 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 203 (2006). See supra notes 1–30 and accompanying text for the legislative
“high-water mark” context of this testimony.
Similar statements regarding the unambiguous purposes of § 1988 can be found in many
law review articles. See, e.g., Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incar-
cerating Juveniles in Adult Jails, 66 IND.L.J. 999, 1018 n.122 (1991); Stanley M. Grossman,
Statutory Fees Shifting in Civil Rights Class Actions: Incentive or Liability?, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 587, 589, 592 (1997); Edward A. Morse, Taxing Plaintiffs: A Look at Tax Accounting
for Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Costs, 107 DICK. L. REV. 405, 420–21 (2003). However,
few do anything more than baldly assert the proposition or give a few brief fragmentary
quotations (and these are often relegated to footnotes). This section of this Article will provide
extensive documentation of § 1988’s purposes.
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Court in Maine v. Thiboutot76 came to opposite conclusions about § 1988’s purpose,
as well as about § 1983’s purpose. Therefore, after supporting this Article’s thesis
that Establishment Clause cases ought not be permitted to be brought under § 1983
(and that attorney’s fees are improper under § 1988) in Section I.C, it will be necessary
to examine the conclusions of the two factions of the Thiboutot Court.77 The reason
this is necessary is because, in Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners,
one of the reasons the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected this Article’s
thesis is because the court thought Thiboutot foreclosed the argument.78
But we turn first to the most important support for the Article’s thesis: the
evidence supplied by the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
of 1976 itself.
A. The Senate Debate on the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976
Shows that Fees Were to Be Awarded Only in Traditional Civil Rights Cases and
Two Other Explicitly Named Analogous Categories of Cases
In introducing the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Senator
John V. Tunney (D-CA), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights,79 cut straight to the chase:
The purpose and effect of this bill is simple—it is to allow
the courts to provide the traditional remedy of reasonable coun-
sel fee awards to private citizens who must go to court to vindicate
their rights under our civil rights statutes. The Supreme Court’s
recent Alyeska decision has required specific statutory authori-
zation if Federal courts are to continue previous policies of
awarding fees under all Federal civil rights statutes. This bill
simply applies the type of “fee-shifting” provision already con-
tained in titles II and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the other
civil rights statutes which do not already specifically authorize
fee awards.80
Further tying the Act to the civil rights context, Senator Tunney explained that
he had wanted the attorney’s fee provision to be incorporated into the extension of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.81 Because the Voting Rights Act was about to expire,
76 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
77 See infra Section I.C.
78 See 568 F.3d 784, 788 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009).
79 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at ii.
80 121 CONG. REC. 26,806 (1975), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 3 (state-
ment of Sen. Tunney) (emphasis added).
81 Id.
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the Senate was unable to debate its own extension bill and voted on the House version
instead.82 That version did not contain an attorney’s fees provision, so Senator Tunney
introduced the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 as a stand-alone bill.83
As Senator Tunney explained,84 Alyeska Pipeline Service Corp. v. Wilderness
Society85 was an environmental case, not a civil rights case.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court had eliminated attorney’s fees in all cases—not
just in environmental cases—in which those fees were not explicitly authorized by
statute, opining that it would be up to Congress to selectively allow attorney’s fees
by statute as it thought best.86 The Court did so despite noting that it is “apparent
from our national experience that the encouragement of private action to implement
public policy has been viewed as desirable in a variety of circumstances.”87
Senator Tunney quoted this language88 and noted that an anomaly now existed
in our civil rights laws: attorney’s fees were available in cases brought under Titles II
and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but not in cases brought under other civil rights
statutes.89 Senator Tunney explained that attorney’s fees were “equally appropriate
in other civil rights statutes, because there, as in employment and public accommo-
dations cases, Congress depends heavily on private enforcement.”90
Here Senator Tunney was addressing the “private attorney general” mechanism
that Congress had built into Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.91 In
the context of Title II, the Supreme Court has described the mechanism as follows:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident
that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would
have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing
broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in
form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he
cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so
not for himself alone but also as a “private attorney general,”
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest pri-
ority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their
own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a posi-
tion to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 4.
85 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
86 Id. at 269.
87 Id. at 271.
88 121 CONG. REC. 26,806, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 4.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 3.
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powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the
provision for counsel fees—not simply to penalize litigants who
deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but,
more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial dis-
crimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.92
Senator Tunney hammered this point home again and again. For example, Tunney
explained that:
[T]he reason why this legislation specifically authorizing fees
awards under all our civil rights laws was not introduced years
ago is simply that, until very recently [in Alyeska], it was widely
believed and held that the courts already had the power to award
counsel fees in all civil rights cases as part of their inherent
equity power.93
Tunney also gave specific examples of the anomalies that faced civil rights
plaintiffs:
[E]ven though the Alyeska decision turned on a question of
judicial power and not on the merits of fee awards—and even
though Alyeska was an environmental case and not a civil rights
case—its effect was to create an unexpected and anomalous gap
in our civil rights laws whereby awards of fees are suddenly un-
available in the most fundamental civil rights cases. For instance,
fees are now authorized in an employment discrimination suit
brought under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but not in
the same suit brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981, which protects similar
rights but involves fewer technical prerequisites to the filing of
an action. Fees are allowed in a suit under title II of the 1964 act
challenging discrimination in a private restaurant, but not in suits
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 redressing violations of the Federal Con-
stitution or laws by officials sworn to uphold the laws.94
Finally, Tunney emphasized that he was seeking to re-establish the pre-Alyeska
civil rights status quo:
If our civil rights laws are not to become mere hollow pro-
nouncements, which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must
92 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968).
93 121 CONG. REC. 26,806, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 4.
94 Id.
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maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee-shifting in these
cases. This bill, then, contains no startling new remedy—it only
meets the technical requirements that the Supreme Court las laid
down if the Federal courts are to continue the practice of award-
ing attorney’s fees which had been going on for years prior to
the Court’s May decision. It does not change the statutory provi-
sions regarding the protection of civil rights except as it provides
the fee awards which are necessary if citizens are to be able to
effectively secure compliance with these existing statutes.95
Tunney’s introductory remarks, not surprisingly, often drew on language con-
tained in the Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, which he presented to the
Senate.96 However, the Report was more explicit about the civil rights limitation:
This bill, S. 2278, is an appropriate response to the Alyeska deci-
sion. It is limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws, a
category of cases in which attorneys fees have been traditionally
regarded as appropriate. It remedies gaps in the language of these
civil rights laws by providing the specific authorization required by
the Court in Alyeska, and makes our civil rights laws consistent.97
Only two Senators, Senator Hugh Scott (R-PA) and Senator Charles “Mac”
Mathias (R-MD)—both supporters of the bill—spoke prior to the bill being amended.98
Senator Scott pointed out that the Act would rely on private enforcement, i.e., private
attorneys general, and that it would restore attorney’s fees to cases brought under the
Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes.99 Senator Mathias pointed out that the loss
of attorney’s fees under Alyeska had effectively shut the courthouse door to many
civil rights plaintiffs due to the “staggering costs of litigation.”100 In his statements,
he reiterated the familiar themes: this bill was a direct response to Alyeska but it was
intended to reach only civil rights cases.101
After Senators Scott and Mathias spoke, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA)
introduced “an amendment in the nature of a substitute.”102 The original bill, as
introduced by Senator Tunney, read in its entirety:
95 Id. at 4–5.
96 See S. REP. NO. 94-1011 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 8–13.
97 Id. at 10.
98 122 CONG. REC. 31,471, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 19–20.
99 Id. at 19.
100 Id. at 19–20.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 31,471–72, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 21–22 (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
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Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, Revised
Statutes Section 722 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988) is amended by adding
the following: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provi-
sion of section 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 of the Revised
Statutes, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”103
Senator Kennedy’s substitute did two things, one stylistic, one substantive. First,
it provided for the citation of the Act as the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
of 1976.104 Second, it added the words “title IX of Public law 92-318,” i.e., the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, between “sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the
Revised statutes” and “or title VI of the civil rights Act of 1964.”105 Senator Ken-
nedy covered much familiar ground in summarizing the purpose of the bill: he noted
that it was necessitated by Alyeska, that without it many plaintiffs would not be able
to sue, and that it was designed to eliminate anomalies in our civil rights statutes.106
Kennedy also explained why an amendment was needed. The purpose of the
amendment was to “expedite final enactment of [the] bill” by conforming it to the
version pending in the House of Representatives.107 This was necessary because Repre-
sentative Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) had added an amendment to this effect to the
House bill when it was under consideration in the House Judiciary Committee.108
Representative Holtzman had made it clear that her amendment was designed
to fight discrimination.109 Speaking during the House debate, she stated that the Act
would “help to assure that all Americans can have access to the courts to obtain the
protections against discrimination contained in our laws and the Constitution.”110
She went on to note that she was “particularly pleased that the bill includes the
amendment [she] offered in the Judiciary Committee adding title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972—which prohibits discrimination in education on the basis of
103 121 CONG. REC. 26,806 (1975), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 5. The
Revised Statutes of 1875 was the first codification of public laws in which those laws were
categorized by subject matter and assigned title and section numbers. Then, in 1926, the first
edition of the United States Code was published, and sections of the Revised Statutes were
rearranged, still by subject, into the new titles of the Code and assigned new section numbers.
Hence, § 1979 of the Revised Statutes is the 1875 version of the current Code § 1983.
104 122 CONG. REC. 31,471 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 21.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 22.
107 122 CONG. REC., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 21 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (referring to H.R. 15460).
108 122 CONG. REC., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 267.
109 Id.
110 Id. (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
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sex—to the civil rights statutes covered by this bill.”111 She also gave specific
examples: “It is vitally important for protecting women from discrimination in
admission to graduate school, tracking into vocational programs, which lead to dead
end jobs, discrimination in faculty promotion and tenure decision, and other forms
of discrimination.”112
In addressing Representative Holtzman’s amendment, Senator Kennedy was
careful to fit the Title IX provision squarely under the civil rights and Fourteenth
Amendment rubrics:
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that dis-
crimination on the basis of sex is both pervasive and persistent.
For that reason Congress has banned sex discrimination in such
areas as employment, housing, credit, and, in title IX of the
Emergency School Aid Act, education programs or activities
which receive Federal assistance. The title is the analog, in the
field of education, of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or sex, they
[sic] violate fundamental rights which are at the bedrock of our
society’s notion of fair play and human decency. It is Congress’
obligation to enforce the 14th amendment by eliminating en-
tirely such forms of discrimination, and that is why both title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 have been included. As basic provisions
of the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created,
it is essential that private enforcement be made possible by
authorizing attorneys’ fees in this essential area of the law.
. . . .
Title IX also reaches another pernicious form of discrimination—
that against blind people and those who are visually impaired—and
in these circumstances the same fundamental principles apply.113
The remainder of the Senate debate can be summarized as follows: First, numerous
senators who favored the bill reiterated the points discussed above.114 Second, those
senators who opposed the bill filibustered and offered various amendments, the purpose
111 Id. (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
112 Id. (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
113 122 CONG. REC. 31,471 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 22
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
114 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 31,832 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73,
at 74–75 (statement of Sen. Hathaway); 122 CONG. REC. 31,850–51, reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK,supra note 73, at 91–92 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 122 CONG.REC.32,185, reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 138–39 (statement of Sen. Tunney).
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of which was merely to delay the vote.115 Third, one amendment was offered by those
who supported the bill, which was never voted upon, that would have allowed prevail-
ing defendants to be awarded attorneys’ fees without having to show that the lawsuit
had been brought “in bad faith, frivolously, vexatiously, or for the purpose of harass-
ing such defendant.”116 Fourth, some substantive discussion of the content of the
final bill occurred.117
One of the few additional insights available can be gleaned from comments by
Senator Long (D-LA) who was worried about a slippery slope.118 However, even his
“slippery slope” was limited to discrimination cases: “When you start out with this,
you cannot decline to pay the lawyer’s fee for those who sue because of sex discrim-
ination, because of disability discrimination, because of any type of discrimination
whatever, with respect to those who have a meritorious lawsuit.”119
Similarly, Senator Helms (R-NC) worried that “[t]he civil rights statutes affected
by this legislation . . . are broad, ambiguous, and far-ranging in coverage. Depending
upon who may interpret their effect, they could be easily interpreted by some to reach
conduct which the vast majority of Americans would consider not only constitu-
tionally permitted but totally proper.”120 Here, too, the slippery slope only extends to
civil rights statutes, but once §§ 1983 and 1988 are extended to the Establishment
Clause context, this worry becomes reality in light of the Supreme Court’s confusing
and inconsistent jurisprudence in that area.
Furthermore, the litigation explosion and the financial aspect of the slippery slope
were discussed. For example, Senator Allen (D-AL) asked rhetorically, “Is the concern
for protecting civil rights, or is it for protecting the fees of attorneys, who have grown
fat on litigation of this sort?”121 Senator Allen actually introduced an amendment to
rename the bill “the Tunney-Kennedy Civil Rights Attorneys Relief Act of 1976.”122
And several senators noted that localities were in effect being blackmailed.123 For
example, Senator Long (D-LA) feared that the Act would “encourage everybody in
America to sue every little town. Podunk will be sued, Cripple Creek will be sued,
115 See 122 CONG. REC. 31,850 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 91
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“This is an amendment offered by the Senator from Alabama
which, along with many of his others, has the clear purpose to delay and frustrate the very
serious objective of this legislation.”).
116 122 CONG. REC. 31,792, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 64.
117 E.g., id. at 62–63. For a detailed discussion of these four aspects of the Senate debate,
see Paying Your Own Way, supra note 16, at 75–77 (testimony of Fitschen).
118 See 122 CONG. REC. 32,187 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 140
(statement of Sen. Long).
119 Id.
120 122 CONG. REC. 31,834, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 80.
121 122 CONG. REC. 31,474, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 27.
122 122 CONG. REC. 31,850, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 89.
123 See 122 CONG. REC. 31,489, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 62.
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Dry Prong will be sued. Every little town in America will be sued.”124 And Senator
Helms addressed “public interest law suits where the legal fees have . . . ranged from
$200,000 to $800,000” in 1976 or pre-1976 dollars.125
Furthermore, an exchange between Senators Helms and Kennedy demonstrates
that cases in which abortion was an issue would not fall under the civil rights rubric.126
Another clear statement that the bill was meant to address only civil rights statutes
occurred when Senator Kennedy addressed the amendment offered by Senator Allen
that added attorney’s fees for cases in which the IRS harassed taxpayers:
I welcome the Allen amendment. While the original purpose
of this bill was to authorize awards of fees in court actions
brought to enforce our civil rights laws, there is no question that
there are numerous other situations where fees are justified.
One such situation is indeed where taxpayers suffer harass-
ment from the Internal Revenue Service. . . .
. . . .
It should be clear, then, that a provision authorizing fee awards
in tax cases has a fundamentally different purpose from one au-
thorizing awards in lawsuits brought by private citizens to en-
force the protections of our civil rights laws. In enacting the basic
civil rights attorney’s fees awards bill, Congress clearly intends
to facilitate and to encourage the bringing of actions to enforce
the protections of the civil rights laws. By authorizing awards of
fees to prevailing defendants in cases brought under the Internal
Revenue Code, however, Congress merely intends to protect
citizens from becoming victims of frivolous or otherwise unwar-
ranted lawsuits.127
Finally, we address that part of the Senate debate that was especially important
to the Supreme Court in Maine v. Thiboutot.128 Senator Kennedy gave examples of
the type of cases in which attorney’s fees had been awarded prior to Alyeska. He cited
cases in which a Black veteran had been denied burial in a local cemetery, in which
Black people had been kept off of juries, in which a Black man had been harassed
by the police, in which doctors rendering assistance to Black people had been denied
privileges at a local hospital, in which a highway was put through a Black rather
than a White neighborhood, in which Black people were charged higher rents in a
housing project, in which housing projects were segregated, in which a housing
124 122 CONG. REC. 31,489, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 62.
125 122 CONG. REC. 31,833, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 78.
126 122 CONG. REC. 32,396, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 169.
127 122 CONG. REC. 33,312–13, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 196–98.
128 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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project advertised “Whites only,” in which officials accepted Social Security Act
funds and failed to provide services, and in which mental patients were forced into
unpaid labor against their will.129 Senator Kennedy mentioned no case names.130
However, all but the last two cases are unremarkable for their relationship to civil
rights. Nonetheless, Senator Kennedy’s reference to the cases involving Social Security
funds and highway construction was of great significance to the Supreme Court
majority in Thiboutot,131 and we shall examine this fact in Section I.C.132 Senator
Kennedy did not identify the case involving mental patients, but it may be a con-
fused description of a case cited in the House Report, which will be examined in the
next subsection.133
Thus, the record is clear: absent these few stray references that will be addressed
below, the entire debate in the Senate centered on guaranteeing attorneys’ fees in the
civil rights context—whether statutorily or constitutionally based.
B. The House Debate on the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976
Also Shows that Fees Were to Be Awarded Only in Traditional Civil Rights
Cases and Two Other Explicitly Named Analogous Categories of Cases
Next, we examine the record from the House of Representatives. The House
debate was much shorter than the Senate debate—obviously the House was feeling
even more time pressure than the Senate, since the bill was taken up on the last day
of the session.134
The overall tenor of the Senate debate was repeated in the House: the bill was
all about civil rights.135 So for example, Representative Kastenmeier (D-WI) noted:
We held 3 days of hearings, and determined, consistent with the
Justice Department suggestions, that our initial approach to the
problem would be to respond with narrowly drawn legislation:
129 122 CONG. REC. 33,314 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 201.
130 See id.
131 The Court identified the cases Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1976), regarding
Social Security funds, and La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), regarding
highway construction, as “an example of the cases ‘enforc[ing] the rights promised by
Congress or the Constitution’ which the Act [§ 1988] would embrace.” Thiboutot, 448 U.S.,
at 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Sen. Kennedy, 122 CONG. REC. 33,314 (1976),
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 202).
132 See infra Section I.C.
133 See infra Section I.B.
134 122 CONG. REC. 35,115 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 238
(statements by Reps. Rousselot (R-CA) and Anderson (R-IL), respectively, indicating that
“the hour is late” and they were “in the last day of [the] session”).
135 See 122 CONG. REC. 35,114–16, 35,124, 35,126–28 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 73, at 236–39, 252–53, 259–60, 263–69.
128 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:107
such as, to authorize attorney’s fees in those specific situations
where private enforcement of civil and constitutional rights was
anticipated and to be supported.136
Representative Kastenmeier went on to give examples of the types of cases that
would be covered.137 Interestingly, he chose four of the same cases that Senator
Kennedy had given—the cases in which a Black veteran had been denied burial in
a local cemetery, in which Black people had been excluded from juries, in which doc-
tors rendering assistance to Black people had been denied privileges at a local hospital,
and in which mental patients were forced into unpaid labor against their wills—but
did not include the Social Security case or the highway construction case.138
Similarly, Representative Fish (R-NY) gave examples of the type of cases that
would be impacted, citing examples of cases that had previously been litigated.139
All of them involved civil rights, including the three that he specifically stated were
filed under § 1983:
First. Suits under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes—and
section 1978—against real estate companies which refused to
sell lots to blacks. Lee v. Southern Home Sites (429 F. 2d 290
(5th Cir. 1970)).
Second. Suits under section 1978 of the Revised Statutes
against realtors who discriminate in renting residential property.
Brown v. Dallas (331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971)).
Third. Suits under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes, by
blacks denied employment by the State highway safety patrol on
the basis of race, Morrow v. Ortsler (F. Supp. (S.D. Miss.,
Sept. 29, 1971)), and against a housing authority violating the
14th amendment equal protection clause by fixing rentals for
136 122 CONG. REC. 35,126 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 263.
There are numerous references to “the Justice Department,” “the Department of Justice,” and
“the Administration” in the Source Book, both on the Senate side and the House side, as can
be verified by searching for those terms in a searchable version of the Source Book, such as
that available at https://archive.org/details/attor00unit [https://perma.cc/5VTJ-83U8]. Doing
such a search will verify that statements such as “the Administration supports this legis-
lation” is another way of documenting that the civil-rights-statutes-only interpretation of the
Act is correct.
137 See id.
138 122 CONG. REC. 35,126, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 263–64. See
also supra note 131 and accompanying text (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Like Senator
Kennedy, Representative Kastenmeier did not mention the name of the mental patient case,
so again we cannot know whether this was a garbled description of the mental patient case
mentioned in the House Report. See infra text accompanying note 167.
139 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 35,126 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73,
at 264–65.
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welfare recipients at a higher rate than for nonwelfare recipients
who had the same income. Hammond v. Housing Authority and
Urban Renewal Agency of Lane County, Oreg. (328 F. Supp. 586
(D. Oreg. 1971)).
Fourth. Suits under section 1980 of the Revised Statutes—
and sections 1977, 1979, and 1990—by inmates of a penitentiary
alleging violation of the inmates’ rights under the 1st, 8th, 13th,
and 14th amendments. Gates v. Collier (F. Supp. [(]N.D. Miss.,
Feb. 14, 1973)).
Fifth. Suits under section 1981 of the Revised Statutes, which
allows action against those having knowledge of a conspiracy to
deprive persons of their civil rights and ability to prevent it, yet
they do not, as in the case of police officers who witnessed one
officer beat the plaintiff and did nothing to prevent it. Symkowski
v. Miller (294 F. Supp. 1214 (D.C. Wis., 1969)).140
It is important to note that the reference to the First Amendment in Representative
Fish’s statement is not a reference to the Establishment Clause. Rather it is a reference
to rights implicated by the opening of inmate mail.141
Furthermore, the House Report listed all the laws that would be “covered or
amended by” Public Law 94-559.142 The list is repeated as Appendix A to the Source
Book itself.143 The listed statutes are, of course, those on the face of the Act, namely
the Reconstruction Era statutes and the relevant provisions of Title IX.144
The real insight here can be gained from the “Scope of the Bill” section of the
bill. There the report notes that the “affected sections of Title 42 generally prohibit
denial of civil and constitutional rights in a variety of areas.”145 It goes on to address
each section individually.146 In its description of § 1983, the report notes that § 1983
is utilized to challenge “official discrimination, such as racial segregation imposed
by law,”147 and cites Brown v. Board of Education.148 The report also notes that
§ 1983 is used in non-racial situations, citing pertinent cases. The examples include
poll taxes (which obviously affect minorities, but which is not per se racial, even
though they can function as a proxy for race), unconstitutional searches, political
affiliation discrimination, and unlawful terms and conditions of confinement.149
140 122 CONG. REC. 35,126, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 265.
141 See Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482, 484 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
142 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 222 (App. B to the House Report of Sept. 15, 1976).
143 Id. at 281.
144 See id. at 222, 281.
145 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 212.
146 Id. at 4–5, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 212–13.
147 Id. at 4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 212.
148 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
149 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 5, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 213 (citing
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Each of these § 1983 cases clearly falls under the civil rights rubric. The poll tax
case, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, was decided under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court explicitly stating “[o]ur cases demon-
strate that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the
States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate.”150 The em-
ployment discrimination case, Elrod v. Burns, of course involves discrimination.151
The unconstitutional search case, Monroe v. Pape,152 requires a bit more explanation
and foreshadows the discussion of Part II below. It also helps one understand the
institutional confinement case, O’Connor v. Donaldson.153 In Monroe, because the
central question was the proper construction of § 1983 (in order to determine whether
localities could be sued under § 1983), Justice Douglas, writing for a partially
unanimous Court,154 reviewed the history of its enactment, which demonstrates that
the Court was clearly aware that the main evil targeted was the Ku Klux Klan.155
Justice Douglas quoted statements made by various senators and representatives
during debate on the Ku Klux Klan Act to demonstrate this, but also quoted other
statements to show that the 42nd Congress, which debated the Act, clearly under-
stood that the protections of the bill would extend to everyone, not just the freed
slaves: “This section gives to any person who may have been injured in any of his
rights, privileges, or immunities of person or property, a civil action for damages
against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts.”156 This point was made plain by the
opponents of the bill, yet the majority in both Houses passed the bill with this
knowledge.157 The main point here is not that the protections extended beyond racial
minorities (since the plaintiffs in Monroe were Black and were subjected to racial
slurs during the search at issue).158 The point is that the protections extended beyond
discrimination. However, what was at issue was, in the words just quoted, “rights,
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll taxes); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961) (unconstitutional search); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (employment
discrimination); and O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (institutional confinement)).
150 383 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
151 427 U.S. 347.
152 365 U.S. 167. Monroe played an important role in the history of the interpretation of
§ 1983. In Monroe, the Supreme Court held that local governments are immune from suit
under § 1983. See id. at 186. This aspect of Monroe was overturned in Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). It goes without saying that, had this aspect of Monroe
not been overturned, localities would be able to be blackmailed under § 1983.
153 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
154 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Court that
the locality, the City of Chicago, was not liable under § 1983).
155 See id. at 172–83 (majority opinion).
156 Id. at 178 (quoting Rep. Kerr of Indiana in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app.
50 (emphasis added)).
157 Id. (“It was precisely that breadth of the remedy which the opposition emphasized.”).
158 Id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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privileges, or immunities of person or property.”159 The facts of Monroe are a sad
modern-day counterpart to the violence § 1983 was originally aimed to cure. In his dis-
senting opinion, Justice Frankfurter summarized the facts alleged in the complaint:
The complaint alleges that on October 29, 1958, at 5:45 a. m.,
thirteen Chicago police officers, led by Deputy Chief of Detec-
tives Pape, broke through two doors of the Monroe apartment,
woke the Monroe couple with flashlights, and forced them at
gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center of the
living room; that the officers roused the six Monroe children and
herded them into the living room; that Detective Pape struck Mr.
Monroe several times with his flashlight, calling him “nigger”
and “black boy”; that another officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that
other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed
them to the floor; that the police ransacked every room, throw-
ing clothing from closets to the floor, dumping drawers, ripping
mattress covers; that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police
station and detained on “open” charges for ten hours, during
which time he was interrogated about a murder and exhibited in
lineups; that he was not brought before a magistrate, although
numerous magistrate’s courts were accessible; that he was not
advised of his procedural rights; that he was not permitted to call
his family or an attorney; that he was subsequently released
without criminal charges having been filed against him. It is also
alleged that the actions of the officers throughout were without
authority of a search warrant or an arrest warrant; that those
actions constituted arbitrary and unreasonable conduct; that the
officers were employees of the City of Chicago, which furnished
each of them with a badge and an identification card designating
him as a member of the Police Department; that the officers
were agents of the city, acting in the course of their employment
and engaged in the performance of their duties; and that it is the
custom of the Department to arrest and confine individuals for
prolonged periods on “open” charges for interrogation, with the
purpose of inducing incriminating statements, exhibiting its
prisoners for identification, holding them incommunicado while
police officers investigate their activities, and punishing them by
imprisonment without judicial trial.160
159 Id. at 178 (majority opinion) (quoting Rep. Kerr of Indiana in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. 50 (emphasis added)).
160 Id. at 203–04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The violence and deprivation of rights alleged in Monroe corresponds all too well
with the violence and deprivation of rights that prompted the enactment of the Ku
Klux Klan Act.161
The Monroe Court noted that the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against un-
reasonable searches and seizures has been incorporated against the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.162 As will be discussed below in Part II, the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did indeed intend to incorporate the Fourth Amendment and
many other protections against the states but did not intend to incorporate the Estab-
lishment Clause.163 For the purposes of this Section, it is sufficient to note that the
rights, privileges, and immunities implicated by Monroe have a direct connection with
the animating concerns behind the Ku Klux Klan Act, whereas Establishment Clause
claims do not.164 Having noted this, one can see that the institutional confinement
case, O’Connor v. Donaldson, also falls within the proper coverage of § 1983—the
plaintiff’s very freedom was at issue since he had been confined against his will for
fifteen years.165 Although O’Connor was not forced to engage in labor against his
will, this may be the case that Senator Kennedy had in mind when he gave his list of
cases and mentioned mental patients being forced into unpaid labor against their will.166
If Senator Kennedy had another case in mind, such a case would just as clearly fall
within § 1983’s coverage.
The House debate, like the House Report, also highlighted the fact that refer-
ences to constitutional rights were references to only those constitutional rights that
are related to civil rights, not references to any and every constitutional right.167 For
example, Representative Seiberling (D-OH) stated:
If the law does not authorize the awarding of attorneys’ fees
in meritorious civil rights cases, many potential plaintiffs will be
deterred from bringing deserving cases to remedy violations of
the Constitution . . . .
Mr. Speaker, neither the Constitution nor the civil rights
laws are self-executing. Instead, they rely both on public or
governmental and on private enforcement. The Government
obviously does not have the resources to investigate and prose-
cute all possible violations of the Constitution, so a great burden
falls directly on the victims to enforce their own rights. Our laws
161 See infra notes 243–50 and accompanying text.
162 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
163 See infra Part II.
164 See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171–72.
165 422 U.S. 563, 563 (1975).
166 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
167 See CONG. REC. 36,128 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 269–70.
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should facilitate that private enforcement and should—within
reasonable limits—encourage potential civil rights plaintiffs to
bring meritorious cases.168
One comment by Representative Drinan (D-MA) should be noted, even though
it does not add any new insights, since it will be important when we examine the
Supreme Court’s Thiboutot analysis in the next Section.169 Representative Drinan
specifically named two cases that had been brought under § 1983: Brown v. Board of
Education170 and Blue v. Craig.171 As we shall see, the Court would find Drinan’s
mention of the latter case to be significant.172
A final point may be offered in support of the civil rights emphasis of §1988. Rep-
resentative Drinan noted—as had the Report of the House Judiciary Committee173—
that “civil rights attorneys and organizations have lost thousands of dollars in fees
since the Alyeska decision.”174 This point is not a new one. The same point was
made by numerous senators, although usually by implication.175 However, Represen-
tative Drinan was simply more forthright in explicitly saying so. In reality, it was the
civil rights litigating community that was the real driving force behind the enactment
of this legislation.176 Perhaps Representative Drinan was more forthcoming because
the “deal” with the civil rights community was cut on the Senate side, not the House
side.177 As one of the House Judiciary Committee witnesses has written:
Two fateful meetings took place in the winter of 1975–76
that set the stage for the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act
of 1976. The first was a meeting of civil rights lawyers and ac-
tivists with Clarence Mitchell, the legendary lobbyist of the
NAACP. The subject was the legislative agenda for 1976, and
the consensus was that what we needed was an attorney’s fee
law to help enforce the substantive civil rights provisions that
were already on the books.
168 Id.
169 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10 (1980) (quoting Rep. Drinan, 122 Cong. Rec.
35,122 (1976)).
170 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
171 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974).
172 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 10.
173 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558 at 2–3 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at
210–11.
174 122 CONG. REC. 35,123 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 256.
175 See supra text accompanying notes 80–93.
176 See id.; infra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., Armand Derfner, Background and Origin of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee
Award Act of 1976, 37 URB. LAW. 653, 653 (2005).
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The second meeting took place, not long after that, between
Mitchell and Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the then-
Senate Majority Whip. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
of Montana was about to retire, and Byrd wanted to move up. He
wanted Mitchell’s support, and Mitchell, in turn, said the civil
rights community wanted an attorney’s fee bill. Byrd committed
to trying. The stage was set.178
The Report of the House Judiciary Committee acknowledges the involvement of the
civil rights bar, although not the backroom machinations just mentioned:
In the hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, the testimony
indicated that civil rights litigants were suffering very severe
hardships because of the Alyeska decision. Thousands of dollars
in fees were automatically lost in the immediate wake of the
decision. Representatives of the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, the Council for Public Interest Law, the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Public Interest
Practice, and witnesses in the field testified to the devastating
impact of the case on litigation in the civil rights area. Surveys
disclosed that such plaintiffs were the hardest hit by the deci-
sion. The Committee also received evidence that private lawyers
were refusing to take certain types of civil rights cases because
the civil rights bar, already short of resources, could not afford
to do so. Because of the compelling need demonstrated by the
testimony, the Committee decided to report a bill allowing fees
to prevailing parties in certain civil rights cases.
It should be noted that the United States Code presently con-
tains over fifty provisions for attorney fees in a variety of statutes.
In the past few years, the Congress has approved such allowances
in the areas of antitrust, equal credit, freedom of information,
voting rights, and consumer product safety. Although the re-
cently enacted civil rights statutes contain provisions permitting
the award of counsel fees, a number of the older statutes do not.
It is to these provisions that much of the testimony was directed.179
This is just one final piece of evidence that the enactment of § 1988 was driven by a
civil rights agenda and that Establishment Clause cases were not under consideration.
178 Id.
179 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 2–3 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at
210–11 (citations omitted). The same discussion took place in the Senate.
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Although not addressing Establishment Clause cases—since, as argued, Estab-
lishment Clause claims under § 1983 were not anticipated—Representative Richard
White (D-TX), echoing the slippery slope arguments voiced in the Senate,180 actually
used the word “blackmail”: “We know that many actions today are brought in the
nature of harassment or blackmail, but are difficult to be proved.”181
Although the record is clear on both the Senate and House sides, as noted at the
beginning of Part I, the majority of the Supreme Court in Thiboutot did not think
§ 1988 should be limited in this fashion.182 We turn now to that matter.
C. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Thiboutot Does Not Demonstrate that the
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 Should Apply Outside of the
Civil Rights Context
As noted at the beginning of Part I, the Tenth Circuit in Green v. Haskell County
Board of Commissioners asserted that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Maine v.
Thiboutot foreclosed this Article’s argument that Establishment Clause cases ought
not be brought under § 1983 and thus should not be eligible for attorney’s fees under
§ 1988.183 However, that assertion is incorrect.
In Thiboutot, the state of Maine had denied the Thiboutots certain benefits under
the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.184 The Thiboutots sued,
alleging the denial of benefits violated their rights under the Social Security Act.185
The Thiboutots brought their suit under § 1983.186 As part of its analysis of the coverage
of § 1983, the Thiboutot Court examined what the enactment of § 1988 could tell it.187
The Court started its analysis of the legislative history of § 1988 by asserting that:
[a]s was true with § 1983, a major purpose of the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act was to benefit those claiming depri-
vations of constitutional and civil rights. Principal sponsors of
the measure in both the House and the Senate, however, explic-
itly stated during the floor debates that the statute would make
fees available more broadly.188
In light of the legislative history surveyed above, this assertion is hard to under-
stand.189 It is also hard to understand in light of the Supreme Court’s decision just
180 See supra notes 118–26 and accompanying text.
181 122 CONG. REC. 35,124 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 73, at 258.
182 See supra Section I.A; see also supra Section I.B.
183 Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 788 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009).
184 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 (1980).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 2.
187 See id. at 9–10.
188 Id. at 9.
189 See supra Section I.A; see also supra Section I.B.
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a year earlier in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization.190 In Chapman,
the Court held that neither 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) nor § 1343(4) gave federal courts
jurisdiction over Social Security Act cases, reasoning that the Social Security Act
does not deal with the concept of “equality” or with the guarantee of “civil rights”
as those terms are commonly understood.191
The Congress that enacted § 1343(3) was primarily con-
cerned with providing jurisdiction for cases dealing with racial
equality; the Congress that enacted § 1343(4) was primarily
concerned with providing jurisdiction for actions dealing with
the civil rights enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and most nota-
bly the right to vote. While the words of these statutes are not
limited to the precise claims which motivated their passage, it is
inappropriate to read the jurisdictional provisions to encompass
new claims which fall well outside the common understanding
of their terms.192
Nonetheless, the Thiboutot majority was not bound by this jurisdictional barrier
since the case was filed in state court.193 Thus, it was free to evaluate whether the
substantive provisions of § 1983—unlike its jurisdictional counterpart—covered
non–civil rights laws.194 Rather amazingly, the Thiboutot Court held exactly that; the
federal courts have no jurisdiction over the Social Security Act under the
Reconstruction-era jurisdiction statutes cases because such cases are not civil rights
cases, but if federal court can otherwise obtain jurisdiction, the Social Security Act
claims could be adjudicated because the Reconstruction-era civil right statute,
§ 1983, contained the unmodified, i.e., non-limited, phrase “and laws.”195
Writing just two years after Thiboutot, preeminent constitutional law and Supreme
Court scholar, A.E. Dick Howard, wrote that “[a]fter Chapman, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Maine v. Thiboutot one year later is nothing short of remarkable.”196 As
Howard explained:
Although Thiboutot gives new breadth to section 1983, it does
not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In its 1979
Chapman decision, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the
190 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
191 Id. at 601–02.
192 Id. at 621.
193 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3–4.
194 Id. at 4.
195 Id.
196 A.E. Dick Howard, The States and the Supreme Court, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 375, 414
(1982).
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federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3) and (4) does
not encompass a claim that a state welfare regulation is invalid
because it conflicts with the Social Security Act. Thiboutot per-
mits such a claim to be brought under section 1983, but it does
not disturb the holding in Chapman. The result, of course, is an
anomaly: that the remedial section (1983) is read more broadly
than the jurisdictional sections.197
Furthermore, the Thiboutot majority concluded that § 1983’s phrase “and laws”
meant all laws, rather than only civil rights laws, over the minority’s historically
sounder analysis, which relied both on primary sources and on Chapman itself.198
As the minority emphasized, “We have recognized consistently that statutes are to
be interpreted not only by a consideration of the words themselves, but by consider-
ing, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which
the words were employed.”199
Be all of that as it may, the point for this portion of the Article is the majority’s
assertion, just quoted above, that:
[A] major purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards
Act was to benefit those claiming deprivations of constitutional
and civil rights. Principal sponsors of the measure in both the
House and the Senate, however, explicitly stated during the floor
debates that the statute would make fees available more broadly.200
Of course, should Congress decide to address the issue of attorney’s fees again,
it can simply amend § 1988 to exclude Establishment Clause cases. And, should the
Supreme Court seek to revisit the issue, it can simply overturn the relevant portion
of Thiboutot on the understanding that the Thiboutot minority got the § 1988’s
legislative history right and the majority got it wrong. However, even lower federal
courts could answer the question left unanswered by the Ninth Circuit in Cammack
v. Waihee, when it questioned whether § 1983 is a proper vehicle for bringing Estab-
lishment Clause cases.201 We will first address the Thiboutot majority’s erroneous
assertion, and then return to how the lower federal courts might proceed.202
The majority turned first to Representative Drinan’s statement that § 1983 “autho-
rizes suits against State and local officials based upon Federal statutory as well as
197 Id. at 417.
198 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 11–34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 13–14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 9 (majority opinion).
201 932 F.2d 765, 767 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991).
202 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 1–10.
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constitutional rights. For example, Blue against Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir.
1974).”203 Because the claim in Blue arose under the Social Security Act,204 the
Thiboutot Court used Drinan’s citation of Blue as authority for the proposition that
all statutory rights are covered by § 1983.205 However, Representative Drinan cited
Blue for the simple proposition that § 1983 allows for suits based upon statutory
rights as well as those based upon constitutional rights.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Drinan knew what Blue was about, the
Thiboutot Court’s assertion cannot stand. The Blue Court itself pointed out that the
case before it could be categorized as an Equal Protection Clause case, since the
plaintiffs were representative of a class that claimed to be deprived of a federal right
solely on the basis of membership in that class.206 Furthermore, federal statutory
benefits constitute a property interest, and the protection of property is a civil rights
issue, as recognized by the inclusion of 42 U.S.C. § 1982207 in the list of statutes the
violation of which would warrant and an attorney fee award. In fact, when the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Act was being debated, the Supreme Court case Mathews v.
Eldridge had just been decided. In Mathews, the Court explained:
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property”
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary does not contend
that procedural due process is inapplicable to terminations of
Social Security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been
implicit in our prior decisions, that the interest of an individual
in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created
“property” interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.208
These characterizations of Blue bring it squarely under the civil rights rubric.
The Thiboutot majority also addressed Senator Kennedy’s list of cases.209 As
mentioned earlier, the Court pointed out Kennedy’s mention of a Social Security
case and a case in which a highway was constructed through a Black neighbor-
hood.210 We have just examined the Social Security case, Blue v. Craig.
203 Id. at 10 (quoting Rep. Drinan, 122 CONG. REC. 35,122 (1976), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 73, at 253).
204 Id. at 10 n.8.
205 Id. at 9.
206 Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 844–45 (4th Cir. 1974).
207 “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Terri-
tory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
208 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (citations omitted).
209 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 10.
210 See id. at 10 n.9.
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As for the highway construction case, the majority postured it as one involving
the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and related statutes.211 However, as
we have seen above, Senator Kennedy saw this case as another type of racial
discrimination—a Black neighborhood was targeted over a White neighborhood.212
Thus, this case, too, is validly included under the civil rights rubric.
Based on this examination of the legislative history of the Act, we have seen that
the Thiboutot minority was correct in its reading of the legislative intent. The
minority correctly insisted that:
The only firm basis for decision is the historical evidence, which
convincingly shows that the phrase [“and laws”] the Court now
finds so clear was—and remains—nothing more than a shorthand
reference to equal rights legislation enacted by Congress. To
read “and laws” more broadly is to ignore the lessons of history,
logic, and policy.213
As mentioned above,214 should Congress ever again wish to deal with the black-
mail effect of the current versions of §§ 1983 and 1988, it can simply amend the
statutes as it once attempted to do and effectively render moot Thiboutot’s holding.
Similarly, the Supreme Court could simply overturn Thiboutot on this point.
However—to address the point hinted at above—the Court need not do so. Rather,
the Court could acknowledge that deciding that § 1983 covers all laws (which after
all, by definition, implicate rights, privileges and immunities) is analytically distinct
from deciding that the Establishment Clause does not encompasses any rights, privi-
leges or immunities at all. This latter view is also important for the lower federal courts.
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit was thinking of this very point in Cammack v. Waihee, when
it questioned whether § 1983 is a proper vehicle for bringing Establishment Clause
cases.215 After all, the Ninth Circuit was well aware of Thiboutot when it questioned
§ 1983 jurisdiction for bringing Establishment Clause claims (having, according to
a Westlaw search, cited or quoted it twenty-seven times prior to issuing its
Cammack opinion),216 yet it did not think that Thiboutot foreclosed the question.217
211 Id.
212 See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
213 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
214 See supra Introduction.
215 See 932 F.2d 765, 767 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991).
216 Keycite Search, WESTLAW, https://westlaw.com (from the Maine v. Thiboutot opinion,
hover over “Citing References” and select “Cases” from the dropdown menu; in the sidebar
under “Search within results,” click “Jurisdiction”; click the “+” next to “Federal,” the “+”
next to “Courts of Appeals,” and click the checkbox next to “Ninth Circuit Ct. App.”; click
on “Date,” select “All dates before,” and type in “04/30/1991”; click “Apply”; this search yields
the 27 citing references) (last visited Oct. 22, 2020).
217 See generally Cammack, 932 F.2d 765.
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The validity of this distinction becomes clear when one examines the legislative
history of the Ku Klux Klan Act and the legislative history of, and scholarship
about, the Fourteenth Amendment itself.218 We will examine these matters in the
next two Parts.
II. THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT OF 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) WAS DESIGNED TO
PROTECT “RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES” ONLY
We turn first to the original enactment of § 1983. It is one of the surviving provi-
sions of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.219 Section 1983 started out as section 1 of
that Act. As numerous courts and commentators have documented, section 1 was
one of the least debated provisions.220 As the Supreme Court explained in Chapman:
Section 1 of the Act generated the least concern; it merely added
civil remedies to the criminal penalties imposed by the 1866
Civil Rights Act. The focus of the heated debate was on the
succeeding sections of the Act, which included provisions im-
posing criminal and civil penalties for conspiracies to deprive
individuals of constitutional rights, and authorizing the President
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and use armed forces to
suppress “insurrection.”221
However, for our purposes, we are interested in determining what “rights,
privileges, and immunities” means; and for that, we can examine the debate over the
entire Act.222
The bill that became the Ku Klux Klan Act was entitled “a bill to enforce the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
for other purposes.”223 Immediately after Representative Shellabarger (R-OH)
reported the bill on behalf of the Select Committee,224 and rules and times for debate
were hashed out,225 Representative Stoughton (R-MI) spoke to set the stage.226 He
started with the activity of the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina.227
218 See infra Part III.
219 Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
220 E.g., Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 610 n.25 (1979); Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 164–65 (1970); Developments in the Law—Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1155 (1977).
221 Chapman, 441 U.S. at 610 n.25 (citations omitted).
222 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 317–22 (1871).
223 Id. at 317.
224 Id. at 317–19.
225 Id. at 319.
226 Id. at 319–22.
227 Id. at 320.
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He noted “murders, whippings, intimidation, and violence.”228 For example,
Representative Shellabarger summarized the testimony of a witness who had been
a Confederate soldier and who had appeared before the Committee.229 That witness
had testified that the punishment for revealing Klan secrets was death, that a Black
man had been hung in his county by a band of between eighty and one hundred
Klansmen, that men were killed for being too prominent in politics, that a Black man
was murdered in a pond, and that between 100 and 150 whippings of Black and
White people had occurred in his county in the past two years, with some victims
being whipped two or three times.230
He also read testimony from Thomas Settle, a state supreme court justice,
regarding the Klan’s ability to protect its members from conviction for their crimes:
[I]t is impossible for the civil authorities, however vigilant they
may be, to punish those who perpetrate these outrages. The
defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries. You
cannot get a conviction; you cannot get a bill found by the grand
jury, or, if you do, the petit jury acquits the parties. In my official
capacity I sit with Judge Pearson and Judge Dick. Judge Pearson
issued a bench warrant last summer for some parties, and had
them brought before him at Raleigh. He requested Judge Dick
and myself to meet him. We did so, and the trial extended over
three weeks, and there it came to our knowledge that it was the
duty and obligation of members of this secret organization to put
themselves in the way to be summoned as jurors, to acquit the
accused, or to have themselves summoned as witnesses to prove
an alibi. This they swore to; and such is the general impression.
Of course, it must be so, for there has not been a single instance
of conviction in the State.231
Representative Stoughton read the testimony of a Black man, who along with
his family was repeatedly shot in his own home for voting the wrong way.232
Having illustrated the ravages of the Klan with these witnesses from North
Carolina, Representative Stoughton made sure that his colleagues understood that
the situation in North Carolina was merely an exemplar:
The report, Mr. Speaker, to which I have referred shows over





232 Id. at 321.
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either been murdered, brutally beaten, or driven away at the peril
of their lives. And the same deplorable state of things exists in
South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Texas. Jails have been broken open, the officers
of the law killed while attempting to discharge their sworn duty,
and the criminals turned loose upon the community. Revenue
officers and mail agents of the United States have in some in-
stances been murdered, and in others driven away from their
posts. But a few days ago, over a hundred Alabama Ku Klux
made a raid upon Meridian, Mississippi, and carried off their
victims for execution. A meeting of the citizens was called to
protest against these outrages. The Ku Klux became alarmed. At
their instigation warrants were issued for the arrest of peaceable
and well-disposed negroes upon the charge of “using seditious
language.” When the court convened they again assembled in
force, and commenced the work of death. Judge Bramlette, the
presiding magistrate, was shot and the scene closed by driving
the Republican mayor out of the city.233
Near the end of his remarks, Representative Stoughton summarized the need for
the Act:
When thousands of murders and outrages have been com-
mitted in the southern States and not a single offender brought
to justice, when the State courts are notoriously powerless to
protect life, person, and property, and when violence and law-
lessness are universally prevalent, the denial of the equal protec-
tion of the laws is too clear to admit of question or controversy.
Full force and effect is therefore given to section five [of the
Fourteenth Amendment], which declares that “Congress shall
have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions
of this article.”234
If we look at Representative Stoughton’s last remark in juxtaposition to those
of the next speaker, Representative George Morgan (D-OH), we see the tenor of the
entire debate.235 Representative Morgan disagreed strenuously with Representative
Stoughton that the Fourteenth Amendment provided a valid constitutional basis for
the many sections of the bill.236 In particular, he objected to the third and fourth
233 Id.
234 Id. at 322.
235 Id. at 329–30.
236 Id. at 331.
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sections, which authorized the use of military force by the President to deal with the
Klan.237 Representative Morgan asked mockingly “whether Congress is a coordinate
branch of the Government; whether the Legislature is an independent branch of this
Government, or whether we are living under the dominion of a monarch who issues
his edict which we have to obey”?238 While other speakers discussed various other
sections,239 the points raised were the same: the outrages of the Klan and the consti-
tutionality vel non of the Act. Again, for current purposes, we are interested in the
light the legislative history sheds on the term “rights, privileges, and immunities,”
which is examined next.
Examining what numerous representatives and senators understood the phrase
to encompass, we find that they were not completely unified in what they thought
it meant.240 But for our purposes, it is important that there is no evidence that anyone
thought it included the prohibition on the establishment of religion.241
We look first at a statement by Representative Benjamin Butler (R-MA),
addressing an earlier unsuccessful attempt by Congress to protect rights, privileges,
and immunities:
The bill further provided that the wrongs committed against
the citizens of the United States, for the purpose of depriving
such citizens of enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, guaran-
teed to him by the Constitution, be made crimes against the laws
of the United States and cognizable by its courts. The bill further
provided that every citizen should have remedy in the Federal
courts against the party depriving him of such rights, immuni-
ties, and privileges . . . .242
Representative Butler favored the Ku Klux Klan bill, as it would accomplish the
same goals, which he supported.243 In Representative Butler’s approach, we see an
equating of “rights, privileges, and immunities” with life, liberty, and property, or
in other words, with the idea of inalienable rights articulated in the Declaration of
237 Id. at 331–32.
238 Id. at 331.
239 For example, over the next few days of debate, the following representatives spoke in
opposition to the bill while commenting on specific sections: Whitthorne (D-TN), sections
one through five, id. at 337–38; Beck, sections three and four, id. at 351–52; Blair (LR-MO),
sections two through four, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 71–74 (1871); and
Swann (D-MD), sections one through three, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1871).
In response, Representatives Kelley (R-PA), id. at 338–41, and Bingham, CONG.GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 81–86 (1871), spoke generally in support of the bill.
240 See infra notes 249, 243–70 and accompanying text.
241 See infra Part III.
242 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (1871).
243 Id.
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Independence.244 Of course, for reasons stated above and below, this says nothing
about the Establishment Clause, and—more than merely saying nothing—most
logically indicates that freedom from establishment is not in sight.245
Other articulations followed. We begin with the important statement of Repre-
sentative John Coburn (R-IN):
Affirmative action [not as the term is used today, but in the
sense made obvious in the following context] or legislation is
not the only method of a denial of protection by a State, State
action not being always legislative action. A State may by posi-
tive enactment cut off from some the right to vote, to testify or
to ask for redress of wrongs in court, to own or inherit or acquire
property, to do business, to go freely from place to place, to bear
arms, and many other such things. This positive denial of protec-
tion is no more flagrant or odious or dangerous than to allow
certain persons to be outraged as to their property, safety, lib-
erty, or life; than to overlook offenders in such cases; than to
utterly disregard the sufferer and his prosecutor, and treat the
one as a nonentity and the other as a good citizen. How much
worse is it for a State to enact that certain citizens shall not vote,
than allow outlaws by violence, unpunished, to prevent them
from voting? How much more effectual is the denial of justice
in a State where the black man cannot testify, than in a State
where his testimony is utterly disregarded when given on behalf
of his race? How much more oppressive is the passage of a law
that they shall not bear arms than the practical seizure of all arms
from the hands of the colored men? A systematic failure to make
arrests, to put on trial, to convict, or to punish offenders against
the rights of a great class of citizens is a denial of equal protec-
tion in the eye of reason and the law, and justifies, yes, loudly
demands, the active interference of the only power that can give
it. If, in addition to all this, the State should fail to ask the aid of
the General Government in putting down the existing outlawry,
would not a more complete and perfect case of denial of protec-
tion be made out? Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of a
more glaring instance of the denial of protection.
It may be safely said, then, that there is a denial of the equal
protection of the law by many of these States. It is therefore the
244 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
245 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
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plain duty of Congress to enforce by appropriate legislation the
rights secured by this clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution.246
This quotation reminds us that we must never stray far from the historical context
of Klan abuses if we want to understand what § 1983 was intended to do.247 Further-
more, this quotation demonstrates a close connection between the concepts of equal
protection and of rights, privileges, and immunities in the minds of the drafters of
the Ku Klux Klan Act.248 Moreover, we also see some specific rights mentioned, i.e.,
“the right to vote, to testify or to ask for redress of wrongs in court, to own or inherit
or acquire property, to do business, to go freely from place to place, to bear arms.”249
Turning to the debates on the Senate side, a few helpful comments can be found
there, too. For example, Senator George Edmunds (R-VT) passed quickly over
section 1, showing that in this chamber, too, it was not overly controversial:
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as
defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States
when they are assailed by any State law or under color of any
State law, and it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil
rights bill, which have since become a part of the Constitution.250
That is not to say it attracted no attention.251
It is also clear that the opponents of the bill understood what the phrase “rights,
privileges, and immunities” meant to at least some of the advocates of the bill. For
example, Senator John Stockton (D-NJ) summarized the view to which he objected:
It is insisted that when the fourteenth amendment declares
that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States shall be
citizens of the United States” the privileges of that citizenship
attach to every individual, and the United States Government is
bound to protect them. These privileges are alleged to be such as
are asserted in the Declaration of Independence, namely, “the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property.”252
246 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871).
247 See supra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.
248 See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
249 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871).
250 Id. at 568.
251 Despite Senator Edmunds’s statement, there was some debate over the meaning of
“citizens of the United States” and “privileges and immunities.” See infra notes 253–61 and
accompanying text.
252 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1871).
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Also, during the debate, an exchange occurred between Senators Lyman
Trumbull (LR-IL), Edmunds (R-VT), and Matthew Carpenter (R-WI) that provides
significant insight into views on the meaning of “privileges and immunities”: Senator
Trumbull, a leading figure in the Liberal Republican movement, stated his belief that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simply reiterated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the pre-Civil-War-Amendments Constitution,
i.e., that the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment were the same
as the privileges and immunities of Article IV.253 He was challenged on that point
by Senator Edmunds who understood the original clause to protect the citizens of
each state qua citizens of individual states when they traveled to states not their
own.254 He understood the new clause, on the other hand, to extend “universal citizen-
ship” to United States citizens qua citizens of the United States.255 At that point Senator
Matthew Carpenter jumped in and reiterated the position of Senator Edmunds.256 After
an excursus, to which we will return momentarily, Senator Trumbull admitted to
Senator Carpenter that Senator Edmunds’s position was correct, but went on to
articulate a position that would later be adopted by the Supreme Court in the
Slaughter-House Cases.257 This is of particular interest because most commentators
have viewed the Slaughter-House Cases as gutting the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause.258 Although Senator Trumbull was the Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed,259
he was among a small group of Republicans who believed the Ku Klux Klan Act to
be dangerous or unconstitutional or both.260
Thus, after acknowledging that the new clause does protect the privileges and
immunities of United States citizens, Senator Trumbull added, “but we have not
advanced one step by that admission. The fourteenth amendment does not define the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States any more than the Con-
stitution originally did.”261 Later in this exchange, Trumbull would get no more specific
than to say that the states, not the national government, were to defend citizens in
their individual rights of person and property, and that the rights, privileges, and
253 Id. at 576–77.
254 Id. at 576.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–79 (1873). For the position as stated by Senator Trumbull
see infra notes 261–64 and accompanying text.
258 E.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 62 (1997); 2 WILLIAMWINSLOWCROSSKEY,POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1119 (1953); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 7-2, at 1302, § 7-3, at 1303 (3d ed. 2000).
259 ANTIEAU, supra note 258, at 81.
260 Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1682 (citing ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 456 (1988)).
261 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871).
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immunities of national citizenship were national in character.262 To this tautology
he added nothing more helpful than that they would be the kind of rights that the
national government would protect from foreign aggression.263 However, for present
purposes, merely note that the minority in the Ku Klux Klan Act debate certainly did
not believe that the Establishment Clause represented a right, privilege, or immunity
that would apply against the states.
The excursus mentioned above provides some insight if one is careful not to
confuse Senator Trumbull’s terminology with the terminology used by those quoted
in our discussion of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act debate; the terms
of art had changed by then.264 Senator Carpenter had used an illustration involving
voting rights.265 Senator Trumbull replied that “[t]he words ‘privileges and immuni-
ties’ . . . have nothing to do with voting. They refer to civil rights. [Senator Carpen-
ter’s] illustration about the right to vote has no application. Women do not vote.”266
Senator Carpenter acknowledged the point, and Senator Trumbull further explained
that the reason that the phrase “privileges and immunities” does not protect the right
to vote is because voting is a political, not a civil, right.267
This distinction seems strange to the modern ear, and those who are not students
of the era will find the following black letter summary helpful in dispelling any
confusion over the two terms:
It has been said that political rights are included within the more
comprehensive term “civil rights,” but that they are differentiated
in that a political right is a right exercisable in the administration
of government, or a right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or management of government, while civil
rights have no relation to the establishment or management of
government. Political rights have also been distinguished on the
ground that a civil right is a right accorded to every member of
a distinct community or nation, which is not necessarily true with
regard to political rights.268
During the entire Reconstruction era, debate existed as to whether suffrage was
a civil or a political right, although the majority opinion—as the above exchange
demonstrates—was that it was a political right.269 All of this gives an important insight
262 Id. at 577.
263 Id.
264 See supra Part I.
265 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871).
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 2, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2020) (citations
omitted).
269 This was also true of other issues, such as serving on juries. These and similar matters
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into what “rights, privileges, or immunities” meant to the drafters of the Ku Klux Klan
Act. The right to be free from establishment could certainly not be considered a civil
right in light of the history of establishment in this country.270 Thus, even on the
majority side, the right to be free from establishment was not in view. However,
since this is equally true of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, we will postpone the
review of that point until we look at the debates over that amendment.271
For now, we will examine the few remarks from the Ku Klux Klan Act debate
that bear most directly upon the Establishment Clause issue. In answering a question
as to whether a provision dealing with obstructing justice would apply to obstructing
justice in a state court, Senator Edmunds replied:
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be
called a private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud
of one man or set of men against another to prevent one getting
an indictment in the State courts against men for burning down
his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this
conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a Dem-
ocrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he
was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter . . . then this
section could reach it.272
This is a direct mention of religion, but it has nothing to do with preventing an
establishment of religion.
Finally, Senator Stockton, just prior to his comments quoted earlier, disparaged
the arguments of his opponents:
[T]he construction of the fourteenth amendment necessary to
make this bill constitutional is simply this: that as the amend-
ment provided that no State should deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
arose repeatedly during debates over the pre– and post–Fourteenth Amendment statutes, as
well as over the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Two books provide especially good summaries
of all such matters. First, ANTIEAU, supra note 258, organizes issues related to the Fourteenth
Amendment topically, collecting data across enactments. For example, with regards to whether
voting is a civil or a political right, see id. at 22–30, 52–54. (Unfortunately, a few citation
errors appear in this work, e.g., id. at 113 nn.2–3; nonetheless, it is an indispensable research
tool). Second, HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1908), provides helpful summaries of the debates over the various enactments in chronological
order and useful information on civil versus political rights is scattered throughout.
270 See infra text accompanying note 275.
271 See infra Part III.
272 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871).
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
therefore Congress can, whenever it pleases, interfere with all these
rights, restrict and deny them in despite of all the express reser-
vations and prohibitions contained in the amendments, articles
one, four, five, nine, and ten . . . . Nay, more; you claim the power
to subordinate the whole Bill of Rights to the absolute and un-
controlled will of one man [the President] . . . .273
While Senator Stockton’s remark mentions the First Amendment, there is no way
to determine whether the Establishment Clause is even in view here—after all, the
First Amendment does protect the rights of religious exercise, speech, the press,
assembly, and redress of grievances, in addition to prohibiting the establishment of
religion. To determine whether references to the First Amendment, such as Senator
Stockton’s, were intended to include the Establishment Clause, we will have to look
at the Fourteenth Amendment itself and judicial interpretations of it.
First, however, we pause to summarize the competing views of the meaning of
rights, privileges, and immunities that are revealed in the legislative history. As
discussed above, these may be summarized as follows: that rights, privileges, and
immunities were synonymous with the Declaration’s inalienable rights; that rights,
privileges, and immunities were civil rights, as opposed to political rights; that
rights, privileges, and immunities were the rights, privileges, and immunities of
national citizenship, co-extensive with those protected by the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV, undefined though they may have been; and that rights,
privileges, and immunities were those things protected by the Bill of Rights. Only
the last of these even arguably implicates the Establishment Clause. However, the
Establishment Clause is unique among the provisions of the First Amendment, as
just noted above. Furthermore, since many states still had established churches at the
time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights,274 as will be discussed in the next Part,
the reference to the First Amendment in Senator Stockton’s comment cannot be
construed to support the view that either he or his opponents believed that the
Establishment Clause contained any rights, privileges, and immunities at that time.
If this is not clear enough already, the discussion below of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s definition of the phrase will provide additional support for this assertion.
273 Id. at 572.
274 See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 20–68 (1987)
(citing primary and secondary sources) for a discussion of differing opinions among scholars
and jurists as to how many states had established churches at the time of the ratification of
the Bill of Rights. For more recent counts, see Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565,
605 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Carl H. Esbeck,
Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1457–97.
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III. THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONTAINED
ANY PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
In examining the Fourteenth Amendment, it is important to remember that its
Framers intended it to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866.275 Therefore,
as background to the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, it is important to note
that, as introduced, the Act’s first section declared:
That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immuni-
ties among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United
States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery;
but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.276
However, the first clause, “[T]hat there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or
immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on
account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery,” was struck from the final
version.277 This is significant in that the broader phrase “no discrimination in civil
rights or immunities” was removed, leaving only the specific enumeration.278 Notably,
freedom from establishment was not enumerated. While it may not be possible to say
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect only these rights, privileges,
and immunities, the list is instructive in that all the items enumerated deal with
specific problems facing freed slaves. Again, freedom from establishment simply
does not fall into that category.
Moving on to the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment itself, we note that
all of the views represented during the debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act were also
expressed during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment. So for example, the
275 See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 721–22 (1989) (quoting debate state-
ments and United States Supreme Court opinions); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 526–27
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
276 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
277 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
278 Id.
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view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause meant the same thing in the Four-
teenth Amendment as it did in Article IV was espoused by Representative Bingham
(R-OH).279 This view was very closely linked to some of the others, like the view
expressed by Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell in construing the privileges
and immunities of Article IV, that privileges and immunities are synonymous with
natural or fundamental rights, i.e., with those rights “which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments,” such as “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain hap-
piness and safety.”280 This is significant for two reasons. First, Justice Washington
was interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and Represen-
tative Bingham, a known admirer of Justice Washington and a drafter of the First
Section of the Fourteenth Amendment,281 articulated the meaning of that section’s
Privilege and Immunities Clause in such a similar manner. It is also significant because
Representative Bingham’s view clearly subsumes the Declaration of Independence
approach. Thus, it becomes clear that, although various views can be distinguished,
many of them are overlapping and interrelated.
Similarly—and we saw the same thing in the last quotation from the Ku Klux
Klan Act debates—many senators and congressmen made statements during the
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment that the privileges and immunities protected
by the Clause were those contained in the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights.
Again, the views of Representative Bingham of Ohio are particularly important,
since he was a drafter of the first section and also a manager of the Amendment.282
In presenting the views of the House Judiciary Committee and speaking after the
fact, Representative Bingham flatly stated that “the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly
defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”283
However, numerous others echoed this sentiment, including Senators Jacob Howard
(R-MI) and Allen Thurman (D-OH), and Representative Thad Stevens (R-PA).284
Just as Representative Bingham’s language is particularly important due to his role
as a drafter and manager of the Amendment, so is Senator Howard’s language in light
of his role as the main manager on the Senate side. According to him, privileges and
immunities included fundamental rights and “the personal rights guaranteed and
secured by the first eight amendments” to the Constitution.285
This at last brings us squarely to the question: Since the framers of the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act and the Ku Klux Klan Act ignored the Establishment
279 ANTIEAU, supra note 258, at 53, 56.
280 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
281 ANTIEAU, supra note 258, at 56.
282 See id. at 85.
283 Id. at 85–86 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 83–85 (1871)).
284 Id. at 86–87.
285 Id. at 86.
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Clause, is there anything in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment that indicates
that its framers did or did not believe that the Establishment Clause implicates any
personal rights?
A complete answer is twofold: The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
believe that the free exercise of religion was fundamental, i.e., was among the privi-
leges and immunities to be protected. The answer also recognizes that any so-called
right to be free from establishment was not. The evidence of this follows.
Following the lead of Chester J. Antieau, one of the great § 1983 experts,286 we
will include insights from the debates over the passage of the Civil Rights Bill of
1866 in this evidence, since the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to consti-
tutionalize this Bill.287 Antieau has collected writings and statements from various
congressmen during the debates over the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, and from congressmen looking back on the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These statements clearly demonstrate that the free exercise of religion
was intended to be covered by the term “privileges and immunities.” Antieau cites
Representative Ralph Buckland (R-OH)’s statement during the Civil Rights Act
debates that “the Southern States regularly denied to Black Americans their religious
liberty” and that therefore “it was the duty and responsibility of the federal govern-
ment to see that freedom of religion was guaranteed everywhere in the nation.”288
Antieau also cited Senator Lyman’s description of the Act during those debates as
being designed “to protect the rights of African Americans to worship publicly, with
an embraced right to preach their religion everywhere.”289 Additionally, Antieau
collected contemporaneous and later opinions from four other representatives and
senators, including from those who both favored and opposed the bill, and additional
statements from Representative Bingham.290 All explicitly state or demonstrate that
freedom of religious exercise was considered to be among the privileges and
immunities to be protected by the Act.
By contrast, Antieau found no evidence of any senator or representative men-
tioning freedom from establishment.291 Antieau surveyed the exhaustive lists of the
rights intended to be included under the Privileges or Immunities Clause compiled
by three important commentators, Senator Howard, Representative Dawes (R-MA),
and Fourteenth Amendment scholar Horace Flack. None of these lists mentions the
Establishment Clause.292
286 His book, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE (1971), was one of the
earliest treatises addressing the history of § 1983. This work is now continued by Rodney A.
Smolla in a two-volume treatise entitled FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS (3d ed. 1994).
287 See ANTIEAU, supra note 258, at 57.
288 Id. at 91.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 91–93.
291 See id. at 109.
292 See id.
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Additionally, Antieau examined evidence of the practice of the states that rati-
fied the Fourteenth Amendment and determined that it is highly unlikely that they
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment included freedom from establishment as
a privilege or immunity.293 This evidence includes state statutes, constitutions, and
court decisions. Some states still had vestiges of true establishment. For example,
both New Hampshire and Massachusetts still provided constitutional preferences for
Protestant Christianity.294 In seven of the twenty-seven ratifying states, the constitu-
tions did not prohibit establishment.295 As Antieau concludes, these states did not
consider a ban on establishing religion to be fundamental.296 This hardly comports
with freedom from such establishment constituting a privilege or immunity. Another
twelve states banned only preferential treatment of any one sect over others.297
One of Antieau’s most interesting points is derived from a New Hampshire case
that should not have been decided the way it was if the New Hampshire Supreme
Court believed the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the states from
establishing religion:
Under the New Hampshire Constitution applicable in 1868, only
a Protestant could qualify as governor of the State, only a
Protestant could become a state senator, only a Protestant could
serve as a state representative, only a Protestant was eligible to
become a councillor. Furthermore, the New Hampshire towns
were authorized by the State constitution to pay the salaries of
Protestant ministers. In that year, the case of Hale v. Everett, in-
volving an establishment issue, came to the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court. The majority members of a Unitarian (recognized
by all members of the Court as a Protestant denomination) meet-
ing sought to enjoin use of the meeting house by the pastor and
some of his adherents, who had admittedly deviated from orthodox
Unitarian beliefs. The majority of the New Hampshire Court
readily agreed to such judicial relief, giving no suggestion that
providing such aid to a Protestant “state church” might con-
ceivably violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Chief Justice Doe, a great jurist of the time, dis-
sented, asserting that courts have no business applying what he
called “a Protestant test,” and adding that his brethren of the
293 See id. at 108–12; see also id. at 282–84 (discussing the Establishment Clause under
the Equal Protection Clause).
294 Id. at 110.
295 Id.
296 See id.
297 Id. at 111.
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majority, in giving governmental judicial assistance to the plain-
tiffs in the case, were “establishing a state religion.”298
While some might say that Antieau was too loose in connecting the dots here, it is
also true that the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment could not have escaped the
attention of a state’s high court. And Antieau is surely correct that had the New
Hampshire Supreme Court considered the Establishment Clause to be among the
privileges and immunities now applicable against the states, it could not have reached
or treated the question as it did.
But importantly, Antieau’s evidence also indicates that the view of privileges
and immunities as encompassing those rights “which belong, of right to the citizens
of all free governments,”299 cannot embrace the Establishment Clause. Just as some
states still had vestiges of state establishment, so also many others had explicit
establishment earlier in their histories.300 Surely neither Justice Washington, who
coined the Corfield articulation, nor the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment such
as Representative Bingham, who relied upon Washington’s articulation, would have
considered these states to be unfree governments.
Because no view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that was advocated in
the Fourteenth Amendment debates saw the Establishment Clause as creating such
privileges or immunities, we need not decide which of the views of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause expressed in the Slaughter-House Cases is correct. None of
them is in tension with the thesis of this Article.
In those cases, Justice Miller, writing for the majority, believed that the privi-
leges and immunities protected by the Clause were of national citizenship as had
been stated by Senator Trumbull.301 Justice Field adopted the fundamental rights
approach,302 as did Justice Bradley.303 These two Justices disagreed only as to the
degree of abridgment to which these rights were subject.304 Finally, Justice Swayne
emphasized that the protections applied to all persons, not just Black people.305
To repeat, all of these views were expressed during the debates, and none of
them are incompatible with this Article. Although the framers of the Fourteenth
298 Id. at 109–10 (footnotes omitted).
299 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
300 See ANTIEAU, supra note 258, at 108–11. I acknowledge—again—the tension between
the various “counts” by jurists and scholars regarding which states had established religions
at various points in history. However, even should readers disagree with Antieau’s count
here, or with the significance of not prohibiting establishment, the larger point stands.
301 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–79; see also CONG.GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871) (statements of Trumbull).
302 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
303 See id. at 114–19, 121–22 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
304 Compare id. at 97–111 (Field, J., dissenting), with id. at 114–19, 121–22 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
305 See id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting); see also id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Amendment—like the justices of the Slaughter-House Court—were not unified in
their understanding of what comprised privileges and immunities, the framers were
uniform in believing that freedom from establishment was not a privilege or immunity.
IV. OF DOUBLE AND TRIPLE INCORPORATION
One could argue that since the United States Supreme Court has incorporated
the Establishment Clause against the states, this Article has been much ado about
nothing. However, such an argument would miss the point. The point of this Article has
not been that the First Amendment has not been or should not be incorporated against
the states. Further, for present purposes, the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause became a fait accompli in Everson v. Board of Education306 if not Cantwell
v. Connecticut.307 Certainly, there have been those who have argued against the current
due process incorporation doctrine.308 And as noted previously,309 Justice Thomas
has argued against the incorporation of the Establishment Clause specifically. Indeed
to return to our high-water mark point of departure, Justice Thomas argued that the
Establishment Clause “does not purport to protect individual rights.”310 However,
given the history recounted in this Article, a case can be made that Congress intended
to incorporate the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights through the Privileges
or Immunities Clause rather than through the Due Process Clause.311 Under any of
these scenarios, the Establishment Clause should not be covered by §§ 1988 and 1983.
However, if one embraces incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause
rather than through the Due Process Clause, the analysis described above demon-
strates that the Establishment Clause does not contain any privileges or immunities.
This certainly makes sense in that it is worded as a limitation on the power of
government. This was certainly the view of the majority in the high-water mark
House of Representatives, with support from Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy.312
However, one need not deviate from the contemporary conventional wisdom on
incorporation to see that there is an analytical difference between deciding whether
306 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
307 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
308 See, e.g., MICHAELKENT CURTIS,NOSTATE SHALL ABRIDGE:THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1986); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 22 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 258, § 7-5 at 1317–20.
309 Supra text accompanying note 5; see, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
310 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring).
311 E.g., ANTIEAU, supra note 258, at 59, 85–88; see also CROSSKEY, supra note 258, at
1089–1118; Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation
of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 647 (2000).
312 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the fair reading of Justice
Kennedy’s view).
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the Establishment Clause has been incorporated against the states and deciding whether
the Establishment Clause contains any privileges or immunities. Furthermore, the way
in which violations of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been thought to be
validly brought under § 1983 has been dubbed the “double incorporation” doctrine.313
In other words, “[Section 1983] incorporates the Fourteenth Amendment which in turn
incorporates various provisions of the Bill of Rights and applies them to the states.”314
It certainly makes sense to believe that if the incorporation doctrine is one of
selective incorporation, the double incorporation doctrine should be as well. The
theory behind selective incorporation teaches that one looks to history to determine
whether a particular provision of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated against
the states.315 Similarly, one should look to history to determine selectively whether
the provision incorporated against the states should be “incorporated” the second time.
In other words, simply because a provision is now binding upon the states does not
mean that it constitutes a civil rights violation as understood by the framers of the Ku
Klux Klan Act. As has been shown, the Establishment Clause does not pass that test.316
Indeed, in light of the history canvassed in this Article and the dispute between
the majority and minority in Thiboutot, this Article posits a theory of triple incorpo-
ration.317 In other words, assuming, arguendo, that the Establishment Clause passed
the § 1983 hurdle, it cannot pass the § 1988 hurdle. The Establishment Clause simply
is not the kind of provision the drafters of § 1988 were contemplating. To follow the
double incorporation reasoning, one would say that triple incorporation occurs where
§ 1988 incorporates § 1983, which in turn incorporates the Fourteenth Amendment,
which in turn incorporates the Bill of Rights; however, at each stage the incorpora-
tion is selective.
In order to take this last step (which is not really necessary at all since the
Establishment Clause claim would fail the double incorporation step) one need only
decide that the minority was correct in Thiboutot and that the mistake the Court
made in applying § 1988 fees to non–civil rights statutes should not be compounded
by applying § 1988 fees to a non–civil rights constitutional provision.
Supreme Court cases such as Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.318 and United
States v. Price,319 which are sometimes cited for the proposition that all of the
313 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983, § 2:3, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019).
314 Id.
315 See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (employing historical
analysis in incorporating the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment).
316 See supra Part III.
317 Obviously since Thiboutot dealt with statutory rights, not provisions of the Bill of
Rights, triple incorporation would not apply there. However, Thiboutot suggests the basis for
triple incorporation in a Bill of Rights context. See generally Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1 (1980).
318 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
319 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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Constitution is applicable under § 1983,320 would not be any obstacle to double or
triple selective incorporation. A careful reading of these cases shows that the Court
is merely saying that the privileges and immunities of the entire Constitution are
applicable under § 1983. However, as we have already seen, the Establishment
Clause contains no privileges or immunities at all.
CONCLUSION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 MUST
NOT BE PERVERTED BY BEING USED AS A TOOL FOR “BLACKMAIL”
Until the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards
Act of 1976, virtually no Establishment Clause cases were brought under § 1983.321
Since then, the number of cases has exploded.322 While the date of enactment is not
a perfect dividing line, it is a close proxy. For ease of demonstration, the number of
opinions available on Westlaw serves as an adequate indicator. To the best of the
author’s ability to ascertain, prior to the enactment of § 1988, only eighty opinions
are available in which both § 1983 is cited and terms relating to the Establishment
Clause are used.323 That’s eighty cases in the 106 years from 1871 to 1976. In contrast,
320 See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and
the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1541 & n.252 (1989); Case Note, The Dormant
Commerce Clause Secures Rights Within the Meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Dennis v.
Higgins, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 153, 168–69 (1991); Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging
State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 429 n.239 (1984).
321 A search for Establishment Clause cases brought under § 1983 before 1976 yielded 47
results, LEXISNEXIS (last searched May 13, 2020). See infra note 327 and accompanying text.
322 A search for Establishment Clause cases brought under § 1983 during and after 1976
yielded 4,001 results, LEXISNEXIS (last searched May 13, 2020). See infra note 327 and
accompanying text.
323 My attempt to determine appropriate statistics for this sentence and for the remainder
of this paragraph was fairly strenuous, but undoubtedly not perfect. An obvious problem is
to choose between searches that are overinclusive and those that are underinclusive, and any
search will produce some false hits. After experimenting with various searches, I finally
settled on the following, which includes all the ways in which § 1983 and § 1988 have been
referred to over the years: (“42 U.S.C. § 1983” OR “42 U.S.C. 1983” OR “42 U.S.C. § 1988”
OR “42 U.S.C. 1988” OR “Pub. L. 94-559” OR “P.L. 94-559” OR “rev. st. sec. 1979” OR
“R.S. sec. 1979” OR “R.S. § 1979” OR “rev. stat. sec. 1979” OR “rev. stat. § 1979” OR “rev.
statutes sec. 1979” OR “rev. statutes § 1979” OR “Apr. 20, 1871” OR “April 20, 1871” OR
“Ku Klux Klan Act” OR “Ku Klux Act”) AND (“religious establishment” OR “establishing
religion” OR “establishment of religion” OR “established religion” OR “establishes religion”
OR “establish religion” OR “establishment clause” OR (“religion clause” AND establish!)).
The search was run in Westlaw’s “All Cases” database in multiple iterations to filter for cases
decided before and after the enactment of § 1988 and for reported and unreported cases.
The bigger issue deals with including terms that capture citations of § 1988. Obviously,
including § 1988 will not impact the case count prior to its enactment. But including it in the
searches after its date of enactment does impact the count. For example, including § 1988
captures a small number of opinions in which fees were awarded for claims brought under
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in the forty-five years since § 1988’s enactment (and as of this writing), 3,547 such
cases can be found.324 At the time that § 1988 was enacted, unreported opinions
were not included in the “All Cases” database. Still, if we compare pre- and post-
enactment counts, the eighty pre-enactment opinions are still heavily outweighed by
1,422 post-enactment opinions.325
If Establishment Clause cases ought not be brought under § 1983, what explains
the fact that they uniformly are? The answer should be obvious at this point: the
availability of § 1988 fees. Long before the evidence adduced in the Introduction to
this Article had occurred, Justice Powell suggested the answer in his Thiboutot dissent:
“[I]ngenious pleaders may find ways to recover attorney’s fees in almost any suit
against a state defendant.”326 This was one of the main complaints of the opponents
of the Act who wanted to dub it the “attorney’s relief act.”327
Certainly, numerous commentators early on documented the astronomical increase
in § 1983 cases after the passage of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of
1976.328 Of course, in non–Establishment Clause cases, this use of § 1988 comports
with the intent of its drafters; in Establishment Clause cases, it produces the non-
intended blackmail discussed throughout this Article.329
Thus, we see that the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
of 1976, which was designed to serve an admirable purpose, has been perverted. Start-
ing as a statute in support of its historic counterpart, § 1983, a statute to protect
racial minorities, § 1988 has now become a tool for blackmail in the Establishment
Clause context, a context that, under any analysis, should not even be eligible for a
§ 1988 fee award.
Thus, Congress should revisit the issue and strip attorney’s fee awards from
Establishment Clause claims.330 It could quite easily do so. The following addition
would do the trick:
the other statutes to which § 1988 is applicable. However, the search terms relating to the
Establishment Clause minimizes the number of these hits. And, on the other hand, there are
a significant number of opinions that address whether fees should be awarded under § 1983
that do not specifically mention that section by number. Therefore, I chose to include those




326 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 24 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
327 122 CONG.REC. 31,487–89, 31,850 (1976), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 73,
at 56–62, 89 (statements of Sens. Long and Allen).
328 See, e.g., MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
§ 1.01(B), Westlaw (database updated 2020) (listing § 1988 as one of five reasons for the
increase); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (suggesting § 1988 is responsible for at least some of the increase).
329 See supra Introduction and Part I.
330 As previously noted, the best approach would be to explicitly state that such claims
cannot even be brought under § 1983. See supra Introduction.
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In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of
Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
[42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 12361 of title 34, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs,
except that (1) in any action brought against a judicial officer for
an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such
officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney’s
fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer’s
jurisdiction; and (2) in any action brought to enforce a provision
of section 1983 and based on an alleged violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution,
each party shall bear its own costs, including attorney’s fees.
While some of the bills introduced prior to, during, and after the legislative high-
water were nearly, but not quite, this simple, some were much more complex; and—
as noted at the outset—some were limited to certain subcategories of Establishment
Clause cases.331
Unless and until Congress acts, attorneys defending Establishment Clause cases
should make the argument that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Estab-
lishment Clause claims brought under § 1983. It’s time for the blackmail to end.
331 See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text (describing some bills and explaining
how to search for others).
